Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2003, a jury convicted Raymond Solano of first-degree murder for the shooting death of his victim, who was playing basketball in a crowded park. After shooting victim repeatedly, Solano fled, but then turned around and shot toward the crowded park where victim lay; several casings were recovered from adjacent streets, and one bullet entered a nearby home. The Commonwealth appealed the order granting Solano relief post-conviction relief in the form of a new penalty phase, based on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to present sufficient mitigating evidence. Solano cross-appealed the portion of the same order denying him guilt-phase relief. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. View "Pennsylvania v. Solano" on Justia Law

This case presented the issue of whether Governor Tom Wolf exceeded his constitutional authority pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution when he issued a temporary reprieve to death row inmate Terrance Williams pending receipt of the forthcoming report of the Pennsylvania Task Force and Advisory Committee on Capital Punishment (Task Force) and until the concerns raised by the Task Force are addressed. Respondent Terrance Williams was convicted of first degree murder after he robbed and beat Amos Norwood to death with a tire iron in 1984. He was subsequently sentenced to death. On January 13, 2015, Governor Tom Corbett signed a death warrant scheduling Williams’ execution for March 4, 2015. Shortly after the death warrant was signed, Governor Tom Wolf assumed office and, on February 13, 2015, issued a reprieve of Williams’ death sentence. On the same day, Governor Wolf issued a Memorandum, explaining that he granted Williams’ reprieve because he believed that “the capital punishment system has significant and widely recognized defects.” Five days later, on February 18, 2015, the District Attorney of Philadelphia (Commonwealth) filed an Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Relief Under King’s Bench Jurisdiction, naming Respondent Williams as the opposing party, arguing that Governor Wolf was attempting to negate a criminal penalty applicable to an entire class of cases (i.e., first degree murder cases where the death penalty was imposed) based on his personal belief that Pennsylvania’s death penalty apparatus is flawed. The Commonwealth argued that the Pennsylvania Constitution did not permit the Governor to grant the purported reprieve for purposes of establishing a moratorium on the death penalty. The Supreme Court indeed exercised its King’s Bench authority to review the issue presented and concluded that Governor Wolf acted within his constitutional authority in granting the reprieve. View "Pennsylvania v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a Superior Court’s order finding appellee Raymond Farabaugh was not required to register as a sexual offender. In 2011, appellee pled guilty to indecent assault, graded as a second-degree misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to two years probation; at the time of sentencing, the law did not require appellee to register as a sexual offender. Later that year, amendments to Megan’s Law added crimes to the list defined as sexually violent offenses, and established a three-tiered system for classifying such offenses and their corresponding registration periods. The 2011 amendments became effective December 20, 2012; they applied to individuals who, as of that date, were convicted of a sexually violent offense and were incarcerated, on probation or parole, or subject to intermediate punishment. Appellee was subject to the reporting and registration requirements, and, as a Tier-II sexual offender, was required to register for 25 years. After Megan’s Law IV went into effect, appellee filed a “Petition to Enforce Plea Bargain/Habeas Corpus,” arguing that ordering him to comply with the new registration and reporting requirements violated his plea agreement and various state and federal constitutional provisions. The trial court denied the petition, and appellee appealed to the Superior Court. On March 14, 2014, while the appeal was pending and after the parties had submitted their briefs, the governor signed Act 19 into law, amending the provisions of Megan’s Law again; the Act was effective immediately and made retroactive to December 20, 2012. The Superior Court panel sua sponte addressed Act 19, holding the above language exempted appellee from the requirements of Megan’s Law. Finding that the Superior Court's holding was made in error, the Supreme Court reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Farabaugh" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the availability of attorneys’ fee awards against insurance companies that have invoked the peer-review provisions of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). In 2004, Angela LaSelva sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident. She was treated by a licensed chiropractor, David Novatnak, D.C., who practiced with appellee Doctor’s Choice Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Center, P.C. (“Provider”). Provider submitted invoices for the services directly to LaSelva’s first-party benefits insurance carrier, Appellant Travelers Personal Insurance Company (“Insurer”), as required per the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. Insurer later requested peer review through IMX Medical Management Services (“IMX”), a peer review organization (“PRO”). IMX, in turn, enlisted Mark Cavallo, D.C., to conduct the peer review. Dr. Cavallo issued a report deeming certain of the treatments provided by Dr. Novatnak to have been unnecessary. Based on this report, Insurer denied reimbursement for the treatment aspects deemed as excessive. Provider opposed this withholding and commenced a civil action against Insurer. Among other things, the complaint alleged that all treatments undertaken through Provider were reasonable and necessary and that the review conducted by IMX did not comport with the mandates of Section 1797 of the MVFRL. Furthermore, Provider asserted that IMX failed to comply with requirements of the Pennsylvania Code directing PROs to apply national or regional norms in their determinations or, where such norms do not exist, to establish written criteria to be used in conducting reviews. As relevant here, the complaint included a specific demand for attorneys’ fees. After a bench trial, the common pleas court entered a verdict in the Provider’s favor, encompassing an award of attorneys’ fees of approximately $39,000. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the decision to strike the fee award. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court: "the Superior Court’s cryptic pronouncement of 'absurdity' [regarding fee-shifting] that lacks foundation. . . . This Court remains cognizant of the shortcomings of the peer-review regime. We have no reasonable means, however, of assessing the degree to which these may be offset by the benefits of cost containment and potentially lower insurance premiums available to the public at large. Rather, the Legislature is invested with the implements to conduct investigations, hearings, and open deliberations to address such salient policy matters. In such landscape, we decline to deviate from conventional statutory interpretation to advance directed policy aims." View "Doctor's Choice v. Traveler's Personal Ins." on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether an order denying a petition to intervene in a custody action was appealable as a collateral order as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. Child ("L.A.") was born on in late 2011 to L.A. (“Mother”) and Q.M. (“Father”). Several months later, Northampton County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed an emergency application for protective custody over Child. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent and granted CYS legal custody. CYS subsequently removed Child from Mother’s home and placed her in the care of Appellant D.M. (“Maternal Aunt”), and Appellant L.N., a friend with whom Maternal Aunt resided (collectively “Appellants”). Child lived with Appellants from February 10, 2012 to September 20, 2012, at which time the trial court granted Appellants and Father shared legal and physical custody over Child. The trial court later vacated its adjudication of dependency on April 4, 2013, awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody to Father, and awarded partial physical custody to Appellants every other weekend. Throughout the entire period during which he exercised custody over Child, Father resided with his mother and stepfather, Appellees V.C. and K.C. (“Paternal Grandparents”). Nearly two months after he had been awarded primary custody, Father suddenly passed away. Paternal Grandparents began caring for Child, and, on June 13, 2013, they filed a complaint for custody against Mother, seeking sole legal and physical custody over Child so as to “preserve and maintain the status quo.” Mother did not contest the matter; however, Appellants filed a petition for intervention, wherein they asserted that they stood in loco parentis to Child and sought primary legal and physical custody. In response, Paternal Grandparents filed an answer and new matter in which they alleged that Appellants lacked standing to seek legal or physical custody over Child, claiming they were only temporary foster parents. Appellants appealed the order denying intervention to the Superior Court, which directed them to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court’s order was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. After review, the Supreme Court held that such an order is a collateral order appealable under Rule 313, and reversed the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal and remand to that court for consideration of the issues raised therein. View "K.C. v. L.A." on Justia Law

The case centered Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995. Although a Section 6105 violation, by default, is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree, subsection (a.1)(1) elevated the offense grade to a felony of the second degree where the defendant was “convicted” of any felony offense enumerated in subsection (b). In 2011, Appellee was convicted, among other things, of a Section 6105 offense, apparently based upon his possession of a firearm and the fact of a previous juvenile adjudication in 2005 for conduct which would give rise to an aggravated assault conviction if committed by an adult. Prior to sentencing, the prosecution apparently took the position that the finding of delinquency should be considered a “conviction” for purposes of the subsection (a.1)(1) enhancement. On appeal, however, the Superior Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The intermediate court explained that the term “conviction” carried a discrete legal connotation that is not generally understood to encompass juvenile adjudications. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether juvenile adjudications of delinquency qualify as “convictions” for purposes of grading within a particularized sentencing regime. The Court held that the concept of convictions, as embodied in Section 6105, did not encompass juvenile adjudications. View "Pennsylvania. v. Hale" on Justia Law

A series of cross-appeals involved tax credits and refunds for overpayments of the City of Philadelphia’s Business Privilege Tax (BPT). The City appealed the Commonwealth Court’s decision affirming the award of credits to Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., and QCC Insurance Company (collectively, Taxpayers), who appealed the same decision affirming the denial of their refund requests. The Philadelphia Department of Revenue agreed Taxpayers overpaid their taxes, but denied the refund requests as untimely. Taxpayers appealed to the Philadelphia Tax Review Board, arguing the net income corrections effectively reset the “due date” since they had 75 days from the completion of an IRS audit to file the amended returns. The Review Board rejected Taxpayers’ argument, determining “due date” referred to the date the returns were initially due (April 15, 2004 and 2005, respectively). Notwithstanding this denial of refunds, the Review Board, sua sponte, awarded Taxpayers credits for their overpayments. The trial court affirmed the Review Board’s decision. Both parties appealed, and a divided three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The majority further held the trial court did not err in affirming the award of credits. Finding no reversible error in the Commonwealth Court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Phila. v. Tax Review Bd." on Justia Law

Hayley Twinn sometimes called appellant Aric Woodard to help watch her son Jaques. Twinn assured appellant that she would return to appellant's house to retrieve the child, but November 7, 2011, Twinn did not show as promised. Appellant called around looking for Twinn, admonishing that if Twinn did not come get her child, she would be sorry. Police responded to a 911 dispatch where a two-year-old male was under cardiac arrest. The child was wet, naked and smelling of feces. The child was taken to the hospital. While at the hospital awaiting a prognosis, appellant stated that because the child had defecated and smeared it on the kitchen floor, appellant had "popped him," and sent the child to the bathroom to clean himself. Appellant alleged the child was found slumped over and unresponsive in the bathtub minutes later. Appellant was ultimately charged with the first degree murder of Jaques, and he directly appealed his conviction and sentence to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Appellant raised twelve issues for the Court's review. And after careful consideration of each, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Woodard" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review centered on review of a Commonwealth Court order Court interpreting a provision of a consent decree, negotiated by the Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania ("OAG") and approved by the Commonwealth Court, between Appellant UPMC, a nonprofit health care corporation, and Appellee Highmark, a nonprofit medical insurance corporation, which established the obligations of both parties with respect to certain health care plans serving vulnerable populations. Specifically, the Court considered whether the Commonwealth Court erroneously interpreted this "vulnerable populations" provision as creating a contractual obligation for UPMC to treat all participants in Highmark’s "Medicare Advantage Plans" (for which Highmark and UPMC currently have provider contracts which UPMC has indicated it will terminate) as "in-network" for purposes of determining the rates it is permitted to charge these individuals for physician, hospital, and other medical services during the duration of the consent decree. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s finding that the "vulnerable populations" clause of the consent decree required UPMC to "be in a contract" with Highmark for the duration of the consent decree, and, thus, that UPMC physicians, hospitals, and other services shall be treated as "in-network" for participants in Highmark Medicare Advantage plans which were subject to provider contracts between Highmark and UPMC set to be terminated by UPMC on December 31, 2015. The Court also affirmed the portion of the Commonwealth Court’s order requiring judicial approval for any further changes in business relationships between these parties which were governed by the consent decree, but quashed as not yet ripe for review the portion of the order which directed the OAG to file a request for supplemental relief to effectuate compliance with the consent decree. View "Pennsylvania v. UPMC" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a series of articles written by James Conmy and Edward Lewis which appeared from June 1 to October 10, 2001, in the Citizens’ Voice, a newspaper in the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton area owned by The Scranton Times L.P. The articles reported about the existence of a federal criminal investigation into the alleged ties of William D’Elia, the reputed head of the Bufalino crime family of northeastern Pennsylvania, and Thomas A. Joseph, Sr. to organized crime activities. The articles included information related to, inter alia, the May 31, 2001, execution of search warrants by a large contingent of federal agents and state troopers at the residence of Joseph, Sr., the office of Joseph, Sr.’s business, Acumark, Inc., the residence of Samuel Marranca, the residence of Jeanne Stanton, and the residence of D’Elia. Defendants The Scranton Times L.P., The Times Partner, Conmy, and Lewis appealed a superior court order which affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County and granted appellees Thomas A. Joseph, Thomas J. Joseph, Acumark, Inc., and Airport Limousine and Taxi Service, Inc. a new trial. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred in granting Appellees a new trial, and therefore, reversed. View "Joseph v. Scranton Times" on Justia Law