Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Stevenson Rose and Shawn Sadik brutally attacked Mary Mitchell in a park in the East Liberty neighborhood of Pittsburgh. During the attack, the men kicked the victim in the head approximately 60 times, stabbed her in the throat, and inserted a piece of aluminum framing into her vagina, causing serious internal injuries. The victim was left naked and bleeding until she was discovered by two individuals. The attack left the victim in a vegetative state. Rose provided police with a statement in which he admitted that he and Sadik attacked the victim after drinking and doing drugs. The issue in this discretionary appeal before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant convicted of third-degree murder had to be sentenced under the sentencing statute in effect at the time the defendant committed the ultimately deadly assault upon the victim, or whether the defendant was subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to a subsequently-enacted sentencing statute which was in effect at the time of the victim’s death 14 years later. After review, the Court concluded that imposition of a sentence in excess of that prescribed by statute at the time the defendant committed the deadly assault violated and was prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. As such, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order vacating appellee’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Rose" on Justia Law

Appellee-Defendant Jose Luis Olivo was arrested in 2012, and charged with two counts of rape and involuntary deviant sexual intercourse and one count each of indecent assault, indecent exposure, endangering the welfare of children, and corruption of minors. The charges arose from allegations that he sexually abused his paramour’s daughter, starting in January 2009 when the victim was four and continuing until February 2012, when she was seven. Four days prior to the scheduled start of trial, Olivo presented a motion in limine to prevent the Commonwealth from presenting expert testimony pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. 5920 regarding child victim responses to sexual violence. Section 5920 applied to Olivo’s September 2012 criminal complaint because the Legislature made it effective for prosecutions filed on or after August 28, 2012. The court continued the trial to allow the presentation of argument regarding the motion in limine. The trial court suspended as unconstitutional Section 5920, concluding that the statute violated the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exclusive control over judicial procedures pursuant to Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 5920 did not violate its authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and reversed the trial court’s decision suspending it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Olivo" on Justia Law

While arguing with his wife, appellant struck her, knocked her to the ground, and attempted to force her back into their home; she escaped and drove to the police station. Police charged appellant with harassment and simple assault. While in prison awaiting his preliminary hearing, appellant tried to call his wife multiple times; she did not answer because the calls upset her. On time, appellant called his father, who called appellant’s wife on a separate phone and relayed appellant’s statements to her, establishing a three-way call on the two phones. Appellant insisted his wife tell the magistrate she would not testify, that she made a mistake, and that she caused her own injuries. If she failed to do so, appellant stated he would go to jail for two years, starve, and lose everything. He also told her that she must comply for the sake of their marriage, which he repeatedly described as “priceless.” Appellant stated that if his wife was charged with making false statements, he would pay her fines. Two days later, she told police she no longer wished to press charges. In light of the phone call, the Commonwealth charged appellant with intimidation of a witness under 18 Pa.C.S. 4952. A jury convicted appellant of simple assault and intimidation of a witness, and the trial court convicted him of harassment. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 33 to 66 months imprisonment. Appellant appealed the Superior Court order affirming his conviction, requesting that the Supreme Court overrule or clarify “Commonwealth v. Brachbill,” (555 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1989)). “‘Brachbill’ did not abolish the Commonwealth’s need to prove intimidation. Whether an offer of a pecuniary or other benefit contains sufficient indicia of intimidation is to be determined by the fact finder and assessed under the totality of the circumstances, cognizant that proof of manifest threats is not required. Insofar as Brachbill is read to mean pecuniary inducement alone will suffice without proof of intimidation, it is disapproved. While understandable, to the extent the Superior Court relied on ‘Brachbill’ to find intimidation is not needed to satisfy a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. 4952,” the Supreme Court held the court erred. Despite clarifying Brachbill, the Court did not remand to the Superior Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence; as “the jury was properly instructed and found intimidation, additional fact finding is unnecessary.” View "Pennsylvania v. Doughty" on Justia Law

Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc. hired Appellee David Socko in March 2007 as a salesperson. Socko executed a two-year employment contract containing a covenant not to compete. In February 2009, Socko resigned from his employment with Mid-Atlantic, but the company rehired him four months later, in June 2009. At his time of rehire, Socko signed a new employment agreement containing another two-year covenant not to compete. While still employed by Mid-Atlantic, in 2010, Socko signed a third, more restrictive “Non-Competition Agreement,” which, by its terms, superseded all prior agreements. Pursuant to the Agreement (at issue in this appeal), Socko was not permitted to compete with Mid-Atlantic for two years after the termination of his employment in any of the locations Mid-Atlantic did business: Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and West Virginia. The Agreement also expressly provided for the application of Pennsylvania law, and stated that the parties intended to be “legally bound.” The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review was one of first impression: whether the enforcement of an employment agreement containing a restrictive covenant not to compete, entered into after the commencement of employment, could be challenged by an employee for a lack of consideration, where the agreement, by its express terms, stated that the parties “intend to be legally bound,” which language implicated the insulating effect of the Uniform Written Obligations Act (“UWOA”). After review, the Supreme Court concluded that an employee was not precluded from challenging such an agreement executed pursuant to the UWOA. View "Socko. v. Mid-Atantic Systems of CPA, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in these cross-appeals by Verizon Telephone Company of Pennsylvania and the Commonwealth was the taxability of Verizon’s gross receipts under the Pennsylvania Gross Receipts Act, for: (1) the installation of private phone lines; (2) the provision of directory assistance services; and (3) certain non-recurring charges levied on its customers for the installation of telephone lines; moves of, and changes to telephone lines and services; and from repairs of telephone lines. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded that revenue derived from all such activities constitutes gross receipts taxable under 72 P.S. 8101(a)(2), and, thus, affirmed the portion of the order of the Commonwealth Court which determined revenue from the first two above-enumerated activities were taxable. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Commonwealth Court’s order finding revenue from the third activity was not. View "Verizon, PA, Inc. v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a legislative-process challenge to a 1988 enactment. This issue was raised in the context of a professional negligence lawsuit filed in 2010, asserting causes of action for wrongful birth. Rebecca Sernovitz sought medical care after becoming pregnant. Because she and her husband are both of Ashkenazi Jewish heritage, their child was at increased risk of suffering from a genetic disorder known as familial dysautonomia (“F.D.”). Her treating physicians, negligently misinformed her about the test results, telling her she was not a carrier. Thereafter, Mrs. Sernovitz gave birth to a son, Samuel, who suffered from F.D. and would suffer from the disorder for the rest of his life. Mrs. Sernovitz later learned that both she and her husband were carriers of the mutation. If she had been correctly informed of the results of her test in a timely manner, further testing would have ensued, which would eventually have revealed Samuel’s condition while he was still in utero. Had that occurred, Mrs. Sernovitz would have obtained an abortion. In October 2010, plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Sernovitz filed an amended complaint against the health-care providers and their employers and corporate parents (“Defendants”), asserting claims for wrongful birth and seeking damages for medical expenses and emotional distress. Although Section 8305(a) of the Judicial Code barred such claims, plaintiffs alleged that Act 47 of 1988 (of which Section 8305 was enacted) was unconstitutional in its entirety on several grounds. In particular, they averred that: the act’s original purpose was changed during its passage through the General Assembly, contrary to Article III, Section 1; it contained more than one subject, in violation of Article III, Section 3; and, in its final form, it was not considered on three days in each House, thus failing to conform with Article III, Section 4. The common pleas court determined that the act complied with Article III, sustained the preliminary objections on the basis that the wrongful-birth claims were barred by Section 8305, and dismissed the amended complaint. A three-judge panel of the Superior Court reversed in a published decision. Having stricken Section 8305, the Superior Court reversed the common pleas court’s order dismissing the amended complaint and remanded for further proceedings. Defendants moved for reconsideration, and appealed to the Supreme Court when their motion was denied. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Superior Court’s decision, reversed, and remanded for reinstatement of the common pleas court’s order dismissing the complaint. View "Sernovitz v. Dershaw" on Justia Law

In a "unique" workers’ compensation case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocated to determine whether the Commonwealth Court erred in finding claimant Laura O’Rourke met her burden of proving that she sustained a work-related injury in the course and scope of her employment when she was brutally stabbed by her son in the middle of the night while she was sleeping in her bedroom in her own home. "While it is undeniable that these circumstances are tragic," the Court could not conclude Claimant had shown her injuries were within the type of harm the Legislature intended to provide compensation for under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and agreed with the Commonwealth Court dissent, that stated it “defied logic” to find this case to involve a work-related injury. View "O'Rourke v. WCAB" on Justia Law

An equally divided en banc panel of the Superior Court resulted in affirmance of appellant Jacob Christine's judgment of sentence for aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another person. Appellant was alleged to have slashed a fellow inmate's throat. Corrections officer searched appellant's cell and found a shank. Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude the shank from evidence, arguing it was irrelevant and would cause undue prejudice by confusing the jury, because the Commonwealth agreed the shank was not used in the attack. The trial court ruled the shank admissible under multiple theories. The divided Superior Court held that the shank was properly admitted, but that the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to question the victim of the attack about his own conviction for simple assault. Appellant appealed admission of the shank. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Christine" on Justia Law

The decedent resided in Appellants’ long-term skilled nursing care facility between March and August, 2010. Due to the alleged abuse and neglect inflicted upon her throughout her stay, Decedent suffered a multitude of injuries and illnesses that eventually resulted in her death. Appellee filed suit claiming Appellants knowingly sacrificed the quality of care given to their residents. Relevant to this appeal, Appellants filed preliminary objections seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement which Appellee signed, along with general admission paperwork upon Decedent’s admission to the facility. Appellants appealed the Superior Court’s decision affirming, in relevant part, the trial court’s order overruling Appellants’ preliminary objections seeking to compel arbitration and reserving for trial the underlying negligence action filed by Appellee, daughter of the decedent, and executrix of Decedent’s estate. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court and remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wert v. Manorcare of Carlisle" on Justia Law

On April 6, 2011, Shaun Warrick appeared in the Philadelphia Municipal Court for his preliminary hearing on two homicide charges. Appellees were relatives of the victims, and were seated in the courtroom gallery. Before testimony began, Warrick advised the court his mother had retained private counsel for him and requested a continuance. At the court’s request, his mother, escorted by court officer Richard Brandt, came forward to testify. Appellees thereupon verbally and physically assailed Ms. Warrick, and a general melee erupted in the courtroom. Warrick tried to defend his mother, which led to an expanded struggle that required deputy sheriffs and police reinforcements from outside the courtroom to restore order. The courtroom was locked down for three hours. When court reconvened, the trial court did make an “initial finding” of direct criminal contempt but deferred “final determination as to what the sentence should be” until appellees could meet with counsel. Appellees returned to court and sought to present their own witnesses and cross-examine other witnesses. The court denied the requests, finding that appellees were not entitled to call or cross-examine witnesses, particularly as the contemptuous acts took place “in the presence of the [c]ourt.” Appellees appealed, and the three cases were consolidated. Because the Superior Court erroneously determined the summary-contempt proceedings were improper, it also erred in concluding appellees “should have been permitted to cross-examine the court crier, and to present their own witnesses, in an adversary hearing with full due process protections.” The Supreme Court found the trial court appropriately conducted summary proceedings and appellees were sufficiently represented by counsel prior to sentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Moody" on Justia Law