Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a defamation action, appellants Randall Castellani and Joseph Corcoran brought suit against The Scranton Times and its former reporter, Jennifer L. Henn (collectively, the Newspaper) regarding the Newspaper’s publication of three articles concerning Appellants’ testimony before the Twentieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. The trial court denied Appellants’ pretrial motion to admit two judicial opinions at trial as evidence of the Newspaper’s state of mind, and the Superior Court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed. Because the judicial opinions are admissible as evidence of the Newspaper’s state of mind, the trial court should have permitted Appellants to introduce them in their action against the Newspaper. View "Castellani v. Scranton Times" on Justia Law

Appellants Margo and Daniel Polett appeal a superior court order vacating a judgment for injuries sustained by Margo after she underwent knee replacement surgery during which she received an artificial knee manufactured by Appellee Zimmer, Inc., and, thereafter, appeared in a promotional video produced and filmed by co-Appellee Public Communications, Inc. (“PCI”). The Global Director of Marketing Communications for Zimmer, Lola Yoder, contacted Margo Polett’s physician’s office and asked him to identify three female patients who had successfully undergone replacement surgery using the Gender Solutions Knee, for the purpose of having them appear in an educational promotional video which would be produced by PCI. The completed video was to feature the women providing testimonials of how the surgery had positively improved their lives, as well as showing the women participating in physical activities they had “resumed since surgery.” According to Mrs. Polett, she learned that she would be filmed while walking on a treadmill and riding a stationary exercise bicycle. Based on her assumption that the producers had consulted with Dr. Booth, and, thus, that it was okay for her to perform both physical activities, Mrs. Polett allowed herself to be filmed while walking on the treadmill and then riding the exercise bike. No one spoke with Dr. Booth about whether Mrs. Polett was medically cleared to walk on the treadmill or to ride the exercise bicycle. Mrs. Pollett complained to her husband of knee pain following the filming, and for three months thereafter. Her condition deteriorated enough that Mrs. Polett would undergo several more surgeries on her knees. The cumulative effect of these surgeries left Mrs. Polett “functionally limited” and permanently unable to fully extend her right leg. the Poletts filed suit against Appellees, as well as Penn, the University of Pennsylvania Hospital System, New City, Franck, and Video Tracks, and, also, the owner of Video Tracks, Steven Rhykerd, asserting claims for negligence and loss of consortium. New City and Franck, in turn, filed a complaint against Dr. Booth, asserting a cross-claim against him for contribution and indemnity. The Poletts did not sue Dr. Booth. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring a tolling agreement between the Poletts and Dr. Booth from being admitted into evidence. The Court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Dr. Booth to provide expert testimony under Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5. Lastly, the Court determine that the trial court did not err in giving its supplemental “no speculation” instruction to the jury. Consequently, the order of the Superior Court was reversed and the case remanded back to the Superior Court so that it could consider the question of whether the trial court properly denied Appellees’ motion for remittitur of the verdict. View "Polett v. Public Communications Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Commonwealth Court applied the proper legal principles and level of deference in its appellate review of the decision of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB), which found Lancaster County (the County) engaged in unfair labor practices under Sections 1201(a)(1) and (3) of the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), when it terminated the employment of Adam Medina and Tommy Epps. During a 2010 organizing effort, Medina attended meetings held by a Union, reported back to the third shift staff members, and successfully encouraged other employees to attend meetings, as well as vote in favor of unionizing. Epps supported the Union’s efforts and talked to other staff members about how the Union could benefit them. A fellow employee reported to supervisors that accused someone of stealing foodstuffs from her open workplace mailbox. An internal investigation revealed Media taking a snack-sized bag of potato chips on one day; Epps took a similarly-sized bag of cookies from the box. Though no one had previously been disciplined for incidents like these, Media and Epps were fired for taking items from the mailbox. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court indeed applied the wrong standards in reversing the Board. The case was remanded for further consideration of issues raised by the parties on appeal but not previously addressed by the Commonwealth Court. View "Lancaster Co v. PA Labor Relations Board -" on Justia Law

On January 13, 2015, as his term was ending, out-going Governor Tom Corbett appointed appellee Erik Arneson as the Executive Director of the Office of Open Records (OOR) for a term of six years, with an optional reappointment for an additional six years. On January 20, 2015, the first day of Governor Wolf’s term, he terminated Appellee’s employment. Appellee filed a complaint for mandamus and declaratory relief in the Commonwealth Court, arguing that Governor Wolf’s termination of his employment violated the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Right to Know Law (RTKL). The Commonwealth Court accepted this argument and reinstated Appellee. The Governor appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, after review, adopted and supplemented the Commonwealth Court’s opinion, and affirmed. View "Arneson v. Wolf" on Justia Law

The issue the Supreme Court addressed in these consolidated appeals centered on the extent of the public’s statutory right of access to discrete information about the implementation of the Medical Assistance Program. In 2011, James Eiseman, Jr. and the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (“Requesters”) tendered requests to the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) seeking records revealing, among other things, the rates that DPW paid to managed care organizations (MCOs) for dental services in the Southeast Zone (the “Capitation Rates”), and the amounts paid by MCOs to provide dental services (the “MCO Rates”). These were submitted per the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL). DPW denied the requests. Pertinent to the Supreme Court’s review of this case, with regard to the MCO Rates, the Department indicated that it had been informed by each of the MCOs that the rates were “trade secrets and/or confidential proprietary information” protected against disclosure. The Department did not deny that it possessed pertinent records; rather, it related that the MCOs had instructed that “DPW is not to disclose” the rates. The Office of Open Records (OOR), however, issued a final determination granting the relevant records requests. Initially, an appeals officer observed that records in the possession of a Commonwealth agency were presumed to be public, unless they qualified for an exemption under the RTKL or other law or are protected by a privilege, judicial order, or decree. In a divided opinion, the Commonwealth Court sustained the portion of the OOR’s determination concerning Capitation Rates, as the members of an en banc panel unanimously agreed that contracts between DPW and the MCOs were financial records under the Law. In the absence of a legislative evaluation, the Supreme Court could not conclude that records which must be submitted to a government agency for approval, were not records “dealing with” the agency’s monetary disbursements and services acquisitions. "[I]f the General Assembly wished for dissemination to be withheld, it would have been a straightforward matter to provide for redaction of trade-secrets information in Section 708(c) of the Law, as was done in relation to eight of the other openness exceptions which are otherwise withheld from financial records." The Court focused upon the conclusion that records which were required to be submitted to and approved by DPW, and which reflected the central means of implementing a core departmental function, were records “dealing with” DPW’s disbursement of public monies and its responsibility to afford access to healthcare services in furtherance of the public interest. The order of the Commonwealth Court holding to the contrary was reversed relative to the MCO Rates, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Public Welfare v. Eiseman" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant George Hitcho, Jr. of first degree murder for the death of Freemansburg Police Officer Robert Lasso in 2011. At the penalty phase, the jury found one aggravating circumstance and three mitigating circumstances, unanimously determined the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and sentenced appellant to death. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found "no basis upon which to upset the death verdict," and affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Hitcho" on Justia Law

This matter concerned a parcel of commercial/industrial property located in Springettsbury Township, which was owned by appellee Harley-Davidson Motor Company. Approximately 110 acres of the parcel contained buildings and other improvements, and the remaining 119 acres were considered “excess” land. Previously, the United States Navy, from 1941 until 1964, and, later, a private firm, American Machinery and Foundry Company (“AMF”), with whom Harley-Davidson merged in 1969, used the parcel to operate a weapons manufacturing plant and, in the course of their business, buried numerous contaminants (as well as unexploded military ordnance) in the subsurface strata. This use caused significant environmental damage to the property. In 1993, Harley-Davidson repurposed a portion of the site to operate a motorcycle manufacturing plant. In 2003, the Assessment Office of York County notified Harley-Davidson that it intended to increase the parcel’s property tax assessment. Harley-Davidson filed an appeal with the York County Board of Assessment Appeals, which affirmed. Harley-Davidson then filed a de novo appeal with the trial court. Appellant Central York School District (“School District”) intervened, and the parties proceeded to a three-day bench trial to determine the parcel’s assessments for tax years 2004 through 2010, pursuant to the Second Class A and Third Class County Assessment Law. This appeal by allowance before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved the proper determination of the fair market value of Harley-Davidson's property for purposes of property tax assessment, including consideration of environmental contamination, remediation, and stigma, as well as the potential for future subdivision of the property. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) hypothetical ways in which a property could be used by potential buyers are properly considered by an expert in evaluating what a willing buyer would pay for a property; (2) the potential effect of agreements concerning possible environmental remediation liability and ongoing environmental restrictions and maintenance is a relevant factor that must be taken into account when determining the fair market value of property, and (3) environmental stigma may be relevant to determining fair market value of real estate for tax purposes in appropriate circumstances. The Supreme concluded: (1) the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the School District’s expert valued the subject property as already subdivided, and, thus, its determination in this regard was reversed; (2) the Commonwealth Court properly concluded that these agreements were not accounted for by the trial court; thus, the Commonwealth Court’s remand was affirmed; and (3) the trial court properly relied upon the School District’s expert’s opinion regarding a 5% environmental stigma devaluation for the property; thus, reversed the Commonwealth Court’s rejection of the trial court’s reliance upon such stigma in its valuation of the property. View "Harley-Davidson v. Central York Sch District et al" on Justia Law

In 2007, Terra Technical Services, LLC subcontracted with River Station Development which in turn entered into a written contract with River Station Land, L.P., the terms of which provided that Terra Technical would perform demolition and debris removal of structures of various types and sizes on a seventy-six acre parcel of land owned by River Station for an agreed upon amount. In 2009, Terra Technical provided formal notice to River Station of its intention to file a mechanics’ lien claim pursuant to 49 P.S. 1501.In 2010, Terra Technical filed seventeen identical mechanics lien against River Station's designated parcels of land, including the buildings and structures thereon, wherein it alleged it had begun the demolition work on the property on July 31, 2007, and completed its contractual duties on December 23, 2008, although it did not receive the full amount of the agreed upon price for its services. Although River Station filed preliminary objections to Terra Technical’s mechanics’ lien claims on January 5, 2011, and Terra Technical filed responses thereto on January 25, 2011, the trial court did not issue a ruling thereon in light of the failure of either party to take the action necessary to bring the preliminary objections before the trial court. In 2012, Terra Technical filed seventeen complaints to obtain judgment on the corresponding mechanics’ lien claims. In this appeal the question this case raised for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Mechanics’ Lien Law required a claimant filing a complaint to enforce a previously filed mechanics’ lien claim to docket such complaint under a term and number separate from that which had been assigned to the mechanics’ lien claim itself. The Supreme Court held that it did not, and accordingly, reversed. View "Terra Technical Services v. River Station Land, L.P." on Justia Law

In this negligence action, appellant Ronald Green, Executor of the Estate of Joseph Fusco, appealed a Superior Court order affirming the trial court’s grant of a nonsuit in favor of Appellees Pennsylvania Hospital (the “Hospital”), Contributors to Pennsylvania Hospital, and several nurses and doctors. Joseph Fusco (“Decedent”) arrived at the emergency department of the Hospital, complaining of shortness of breath, rapid breathing, and wheezing. He was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (“ICU”) and given medication, which failed to alleviate his symptoms. As a result, Decedent, who suffered from a number of pre-existing conditions, was intubated and placed on a ventilator in order to assist with his breathing. Decedent remained on a ventilator in critical condition for ten days. In an attempt to wean Decedent from the ventilator, a physician at the Hospital performed a tracheotomy. The tracheotomy site had become blocked; re-insertion of the tube went into Decedent's throat causing air outside of his lungs to accumulate and collapse his lungs and trachea. The Decedent was again intubated, this time through his mouth. However, by this time, he suffered cardiac arrest and died. Appellant, as executor of Decedent's estate, brought a negligence action against the Hospital and the nurses and doctors that treated Decedent shortly before his death. When a hospital patient experiences an acute medical emergency, such as that experienced by Decedent in this case, and an attending nurse or other medical staff issues an emergency request or page for additional help, "it is more than reasonable for the patient, who is in the throes of medical distress, to believe that such emergency care is being rendered by the hospital or its agents. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s grant of a nonsuit under Section 1303.516(a) was erroneous in the instant case, and that the question of whether a reasonably prudent person in Decedent’s position would be justified in his belief that the care rendered by Dr. Malaisrie was rendered by her as an agent of the Hospital should have proceeded to the jury." The Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the Superior Court’s decision affirming the trial court’s grant of a nonsuit in favor of the Hospital on this issue, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision to the extent it affirmed the trial court's grant of a nonsuit in favor of one of the nurses. View "Green v. Pennsylvania Hospital" on Justia Law

Appellant Ralph Bailets was employed by the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission from 1998 to 2008. Appellant achieved “outstanding” and “commendable” performance ratings while employed as the Commission’s manager of financial reporting and systems. During this time, appellant frequently complained that he observed improprieties and wasteful practices regarding various matters, including a Commission computer systems contract with Ciber, Inc., EZPass discounts, politically motivated personnel actions, and the use of multiple, unnecessary external investment managers. Appellant’s job title and responsibilities were changed in June, 2008, he was removed from an additional position as assistant secretary-treasurer around the same time, and his employment by the Commission was ultimately terminated in November, 2008. Believing these actions were retaliation for his reports of wrongdoing and waste at the Commission, appellant filed a complaint in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, alleging a single claim under the Whistleblower Law, against the Commission, Anthony Q. Maun, the Commission’s director of accounting; and Nikolaus H. Grieshaber, the Commission’s chief financial officer (collectively, appellees). In an unreported, single-judge opinion, Senior Judge Friedman held the decision to terminate appellant was “a management discretionary action, motivated by legitimate employer objectives.” The court concluded there were legitimate reasons for firing appellant, and there was nothing in the record establishing the decision makers who terminated his position were even aware of appellant’s reports of alleged wrongdoing and waste; the evidence instead showed 15 positions were eliminated in November, 2008, because of “a poor economy, declining traffic, and necessary expense reductions across the Commission.” After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court. The Court found sufficient evidence that appellant made prima face evidence of violations of the Whistleblower law, "which at the very least created issues of material fact to preclude the grant of summary judgment." View "Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike Commission" on Justia Law