Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, who had been inside the house, heard the officers enter, and fled through a third-story window, wearing only a pair of sweatpants and socks. He ran along a rooftop, jumped onto a car parked in an adjacent alley, and then ran to the home of Michele Gray. He informed Gray that he had beaten his girlfriend, Angelina Taylor, and that he had fled when he had heard the police in the house. He also told her that at the time he fled, Taylor had been pale, motionless, unresponsive, and having trouble breathing. Meanwhile, the officers made their way to the rear bedroom on the third floor, where they discovered a woman, later identified as Angelina Taylor, naked under a sheet on a mattress on the floor. Taylor was seriously injured, with numerous bruises and cuts visible on her face and body, including her pelvic region, as well as severe bruising on both sides of her throat and around both eyes. Officers called for emergency response personnel, who took the victim to the hospital. She was diagnosed as comatose due to bleeding in the brain. In the trauma unit, a rape-kit examination was conducted, which revealed numerous lacerations, bruises and abrasions. The victim never regained consciousness and her brainstem herniated from the swelling inside her head. Appellant was arrested, and a jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder and rape. The PCRA judge, who had also presided at trial, denied Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief, and Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. Appellant raised twelve issues for review. Taking each and turn and finding Appellant did not meet his burden for relief, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court's decision. View "Pennsylvania v. Davido" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether a negligence claim brought against an insurer by its insureds for alleged statements made by the insurer’s adjuster and an engineer the insurer had retained (that mold the insureds discovered while performing home renovations was harmless and that they should continue their renovations) was barred by the “gist of the action” doctrine on the grounds that the true gist or gravamen of the action was an alleged breach of the insurance contract (their homeowners’ policy); and (2) whether the provisions of Pa.R.C.P. 1042.1 and 1042.3 required the insureds to obtain a certificate of merit in order for them to proceed with their negligence suit against the professional engineer employed by the insurer to evaluate the mold. After careful review, the Supreme Court held that the insureds’ negligence claim was not barred by the gist of the action doctrine, as the claim was based on an alleged breach of a social duty imposed by the law of torts, and not a breach of a duty created by the underlying contract of insurance. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the insureds were not required to obtain a certificate of merit in order to proceed with their negligence suit against the professional engineer, since they were not patients or clients of the engineering company which employed him. Consequently, the Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bruno v. Erie Insurance" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with a possessory weapons offense deriving from the use of a firearm in a broader criminal undertaking, although, factually, another person (Appellant’s brother) actually possessed the weapon during the episode and the defendant himself was unarmed. The weapon offense at issue, “[f]irearms not to be carried without a license,” pertained, inter alia, when an individual carries a concealed firearm on his person without a license. Such permutation, on its face did not apply to unarmed co-perpetrators in a larger criminal undertaking who simply were not “carr[ying] a firearm concealed on or about [their] person.” Nevertheless, the Superior Court’s opinion in this case was that the possessory weapons offense extended to persons who could have been accomplices in the abstract. The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court should have analyzed whether the evidence and reasonable inferences, taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, supported a conclusion that Appellant, acting with the intent to promote or facilitate his brother’s unlicensed carrying of a concealed firearm, solicited his brother to commit such offense or aided, agreed, or attempted to aid his brother in doing so. "In the absence of such a focused examination, the intermediate court’s broader assertion that, as accomplices, Appellant and his brother each were criminally liable for the other’s actions in the abstract is unsustainable." View "Pennsylvania v. Knox" on Justia Law

On Friday, January 9, 2009, after business hours, an unidentified motor vehicle crashed into and felled a utility pole carrying electric lines owned and operated by Duquesne Light. Several wires were connected to Burton L. Hirsh’s Funeral Home, and at least one was stripped from the attachment point to the building’s electrical system located on the structure. In addition to the funeral home, a number of other local buildings lost power as a result of the incident, although no structure other than Hirsh’s was connected directly to the downed pole. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review, as framed by appellant, was “[w]hether the Superior Court erred in imposing upon electric utilities a burdensome and unprecedented duty to enter customers’ premises and inspect customers’ electrical facilities before restoring power after an outage” The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, finding that Duquesne Light failed to adequately confront the common-law duties invoked by Hirsh or the warnings dynamic tempering the Superior Court’s ruling. The Superior Court did not err to the extent that it recognized a duty, on the part of an electric service provider, to take reasonable measures to avert harm in a scenario in which the utility has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition impacting a customer’s electrical system, occasioned by fallen and intermixed electrical lines proximate to the customer’s premises. The Court offered no opinion as to whether Duquesne Light had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonable risk in this scenario, since the electric company’s summary judgment effort was not staged in a manner which would have elicited an informed determination on such point. View "Alderwoods (PA), Inc. v. Duquesne Light" on Justia Law

In 2009, C.B. (an adult male), along with his fiancee K.M.H (“the victim”) and her two daughters, J.H. (age 7) and A.H (age 4), and C.B.’s 11-year-old son J.B. were living together in a two-story rented house in a rural area surrounded by farmland and woods, and situated near the town of Wampum. K.M.H. was found dead with a single shotgun wound to the head shortly after C.B. had left for work for and J.H. and C.B. had left for school. K.M.H. was pregnant at the time of her death. The focus of the police investigation turned from K.M.H.'s ex-boyfriend to J.B., when police found that the ballistics of the shotgun pellets found in the victim matched that found on the shotgun seized from the residence. It was determined that J.B. had learned how to shoot this gun for hunting, and that the clothes J.B. wore to school the morning of the shooting had trace gunshot residue on them. The juvenile court issued written findings of fact adjudicating J.B. delinquent of criminal homicide for the death of K.M.H. and of her unborn child. J.B. filed a notice of appeal from the dispositional order, following which the juvenile court directed J.B. to prepare and file a statement of matters complained of on appeal. The juvenile court did not find J.B.’s weight of the evidence claim waived due to his failure to file a post-dispositional motion. Instead, the juvenile court ruled that J.B.’s weight of the evidence claim had been “adequately addressed . . . in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued on April 13, 2012 and supplemental Opinion issued on April 20, 2012.” The Supreme Court found that J.B. faced procedural rules that made optional the filing of a post-dispositional motion, and which did not otherwise specify how a weight of the evidence claim was to be presented in the first instance to the juvenile court in order to preserve it for appellate review. Furthermore, J.B. presented his weight of the evidence claim to the lower court by raising it in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, in which he comprehensively set forth specific reasons why, in his view, the juvenile court’s adjudication was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that a finding of J.B.’s weight of the evidence claim to be waived under the circumstances of this case would have been manifestly unjust. The Court remanded this case back to the juvenile court to allow J.B. to file a post-dispositional motion nunc pro tunc. View "In the Interest of J.B." on Justia Law

The Mt. Lebanon Police Officer's Pension Plan provided for cost-of-living adjustments ("COLAs") to augment pension benefits for retirees. For the Plan years 2000-03 ("2000 Plan") by the United Police Society of Mt. Lebanon ("Union") and the Municipality of Mt. Lebanon, retired plan participants were eligible for yearly COLAs of 2% of the participant's final average monthly compensation until such time as the participant's benefits reached 90% of his or her final average monthly compensation. This provision did not differentiate between regular retiree participants and early retiree participants. In 2004, the COLA was changed for some early retirees (specifically those with fewer than 20 years of service), to reduce the benefit from 2% of the retiree's final average monthly compensation to 2% of the actual early retirement benefits ("2004 Plan"). No adjustment was made in the Plan with respect to the COLA cap of 90% of the participant's final average monthly compensation for any participant. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the change from the 2000 Plan to the 2004 Plan. The municipality submitted to an actuary making the statutorily-mandated cost study (required by Act 205 - The Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act) incomplete and/or inaccurate information (although the municipality disputed this characterization). Thereafter, the municipality administered the plan term along the lines of the incomplete or inaccurate assessment that resulted, in effect unilaterally modifying both the plan and the CBA. The Commonwealth Court here ultimately determined that because Act 205 has statutory primacy over any CBA, the plan must be administered as understood by the actuary when it made its Act 205 cost study, even if this effectively altered a bargained-for term of the parties. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: Section 305(a) of Act 205 required a municipality to obtain a complete and accurate cost estimate before the municipality adopted any benefit plan modification so as to have accurate information with respect to the plan's solvency. At the same time, a municipal employer's unilateral change of a mandatory subject of bargaining, without first negotiating with the union, interferes with the employees' collective bargaining rights, and thus constitutes an unfair labor practice. Accordingly, the Court held that it was error to impose a unilateral change to the Plan at odds with its plain language based on the results of an incomplete and inaccurate Act 205 cost study. The Commonwealth Court was reversed and the case remanded to effectuate a complete and accurate Section 305 cost study. View "United Police Society of Mt. Lebanon v. Mt Lebanon Commission" on Justia Law

In 2008, Attorney David Landay submitted to appellant Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., an "authorization" on behalf of an individual, requesting copies of the that person's pharmacy records. In response to the requests, Rite Aid sent invoices for $50 to both Landay and PC&G (collectively, "Appellees") for "professional services rendered." Appellees paid the invoices, and Rite Aid provided the requested copies of the pharmacy records. In 2010, Appellees filed a class action against Rite Aid. In Count I of the complaint, Appellees claimed that Rite Aid breached an implied agreement between the parties and Rite Aid that Rite Aid would provide copies of its records to its customers in a manner consistent with Pennsylvania law, limiting the amount that may be charged to the estimated actual and reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the reproduction of the requested records. Specifically, Appellees maintained that Rite Aid's act of charging a flat fee for the reproduction of records violated Section 6152(a)(2)(i) of the Medical Records Act (MRA). In Count II of their complaint, Appellees requested a declaratory judgment that the MRA prohibited Rite Aid from charging more than the reasonable expenses it incurred to reproduce the requested records, and, further, precluded Rite Aid from charging a flat fee. In this discretionary appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the MRA applied to the reproduction of records by pharmacies, and, if so, whether, and under what circumstances, pharmacies may charge customers a flat fee for the reproduction of records. The Court held that the Act did not apply to pharmacies, and, as a result, it did not address the flat fee issue. View "Landay v. Rite Aid" on Justia Law

In this capital case, Appellant Arthur Bomar appealed the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County that denied his petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Appellant was subsequently charged with first-degree murder, rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse for the 1997 death of Aimee Willard. While Appellant’s appeal from resentencing was pending, counsel from the Federal Community Defender Office (“FCDO”) for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Capital Habeas Unit filed on Appellant’s behalf a “Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief Pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution Statutory Post-Conviction Relief Under the Post-Conviction Relief Act [...],” which was deemed to be an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA proceedings were stayed pending the conclusion of Appellant’s direct appeal. The Superior Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on the remaining offenses, and the Supreme Court denied allocatur. Nine months later, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion seeking an order declaring Appellant incompetent to proceed. Following a hearing on the matter and briefing by both parties, the PCRA court found Appellant competent and denied the motion. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a response to Appellant’s PCRA petition on March 31, 2008, and evidentiary hearings on appellant’s petition took place on July 17, 2007, May 28, 2008, November 5-7, 2008, January 15-16, 2009, April 28-29, 2009, September 24, 2009, October 20-21, 2009, February 1-3, 2010, July 28, 2010, November 29, 2011, January 20, 2011, and November 29, 2011. The PCRA court ultimately denied Appellant’s petition on March 28, 2012. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 23, 2012, and, on September 4, 2012, the PCRA court filed an extensive 213 page opinion addressing, and rejecting as meritless, each of the 22 claims in Appellant’s PCRA petition. Of those claims, he raised nine to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error as alleged in any of appellant's nine claims, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of PCRA relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Bomar" on Justia Law

Appellant Harold Winston Noel, Jr., was convicted of robbery and related offenses, and sentenced to an aggregate 29 to 58 years’ imprisonment for these crimes. In this discretionary appeal, he did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, but instead insisted that the trial court’s failure to conduct voir dire in strict compliance with Rule 631 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure entitled him to a new trial. After careful consideration of appellant's argument on appeal and the prejudice it was alleged to have caused, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the jury selection process employed by the trial court. View "Pennsylvania v. Noel" on Justia Law

The issue this Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) appeal presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relative to counsel’s failure to seek suppression of an inculpatory post-polygraph statement made subsequent to a pre-polygraph counseled waiver defendant's Miranda rights. The PCRA court below denied relief. A divided Superior Court reversed and remanded in a 2-1 decision, in the process adopting and applying a test for measuring Miranda waivers devised by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit after the trial in this matter. The panel majority held that: (1) appellee’s prepolygraph Miranda waiver did not encompass the post-polygraph interview; (2) the Commonwealth failed to prove that appellee validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the post-polygraph interview; (3) appellee’s trial counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to seek suppression of the statement; and (4) the admission of the statement at trial was prejudicial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Superior Court’s approach led to an underlying merits holding that presented an important issue of first impression. After review of this case, the Court held that the Superior Court’s approach was flawed in multiple respects, requiring a remand to that court to reconsider the ineffectiveness claim under the proper review paradigm. Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and remanded for reconsideration of the issue. View "Pennsylvania v. Hill" on Justia Law