Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, a jury convicted Appellant Cletus Rivera of the first degree murder of Police Officer Scott Wertz. Appellant was sentenced to death, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. After affording Appellant notice of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition, holding there were no genuine issues of material fact and no meritorious issues. Appellant appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Appellee Andrew Enimpah was a passenger in a car stopped by police; he was asked to step out of the vehicle, and when he did, a plastic bag fell from his lap. The driver consented to a search of the car and police seized the bag, which contained cocaine. All occupants denied knowledge of the bag, but appellee was charged. He moved to suppress, challenging the constitutionality of the detention that led to the search. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor refused to offer evidence until appellee met the "threshold" of appellee offering proof of his reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where the plastic bag was found. After much debate, the trial court informed the prosecutor it would be obliged to grant the motion if she failed to present any evidence. The prosecutor maintained her position, stating, “If I’m wrong[,] the [a]ppellate courts will tell me that[;] then I will respect that decision.” The trial court suppressed the evidence; the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision and reiterated that which should be clear: "In all cases, the burden of production is [] upon the Commonwealth." View "Pennsylvania v. Enimpah" on Justia Law

In 2006, Scott Simons, Matthew Senger and Joshua Sellers (decedent) met at the home of a mutual friend in Abington Township. Simons had been drinking all day prior to this engagement, but testified that he did not drink at the residence. In the early morning hours of December 24, 2006, Senger and the decedent asked Simons for a ride home. None of the men fastened their seatbelts. Simons testified that he was, in fact, drunk when he left the party, and admitted that this was not the first time he had driven his friends home drunk. Simons testified that the police car made a U-turn and began following Simons with its lights and siren activated. Simons admitted that instead of pulling over, he fled, as he was “scared of getting a DUI.” Senger testified that when Simons initially “floored his car,” he was not aware that police were pursuing the car. Senger estimated that Simons was driving “well over 100” miles per hour. Senger testified that both he and decedent then asked Simons to slow down, as they were aware of a dip in the road ahead. Simons continued at a high rate of speed and ultimately hit the dip in the road. The car was sent airborne and crashed into trees and a parked pickup truck. Simons and Senger suffered minor injuries, while decedent was ejected from the vehicle and thrown 20 feet away, suffering a catastrophic brain injury, along with other injuries. Appellants Celeste and Richard Sellers, parents of the decedent, filed a wrongful death and survival action against appellees the Township of Abington, Officer Edward Howley, and Lieutenant Karl Knott asserting claims for negligence and punitive damages. Appellants alleged that appellees caused the death of decedent when Officer Howley negligently, recklessly, and willfully initiated and failed to terminate a high speed pursuit of Simons’ vehicle. After the completion of discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment based upon governmental immunity. The central issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a local agency owed a common law or statutory duty of care to a passenger of a fleeing vehicle, whose existence or relationship to the fleeing driver was unknown to the pursuing police officer. The Commonwealth Court concluded that appellees did not owe a duty of care to fleeing suspects. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision. View "Sellers v. Twp. of Abington" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the constitutionality of provisions of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as applied to juveniles. An order of the York County Court of Common Pleas held the statute unconstitutional as violative of the ex post facto clause, protections against cruel and unusual punishment, and due process rights through the use of an irrebuttable presumption. The seven juveniles in this case were previously adjudicated delinquent in regard to specific sexual crimes and were subject to juvenile court supervision on SORNA’s effective date. Accordingly, the Juveniles became subject to lifetime registration under 42 Pa.C.S. 9799.15(a)(4). The Juveniles filed motions for nunc pro tunc relief asserting SORNA’s unconstitutionality, which were consolidated by the trial court, following the passage of SORNA and its attachment to them. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the determination that SORNA violated juvenile offenders’ due process rights through the use of an irrebuttable presumption. View "Interest of: J.B." on Justia Law

Appellant Wayne Mitchell's petition for post-conviction relief was denied, and he appealed. Appellant admitted to and was convicted of the rape of his wife Robin in 1997. He was also charged with making terroristic threats, unlawful restraint, and simple assault. While appellant waited for his preliminary hearing, the wife filed for a Protection From Abuse order. Appellant waived the charges to court in exchange for a nominal bond, with a condition that he seek immediate in-patient treatment for alcohol abuse. However, for reasons disputed at trial, Appellant was never admitted to the hospital for treatment as required by the agreement, and instead confronted his wife where he later stabbed her to death, leaving her naked body in a lot close to her home. Appellant ultimately confessed to the killing, and later pled guilty to the earlier charges against him, in addition to his wife's murder. Upon review of appellant's petition for post-conviction relief, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the PCRA court's denial of appellant's petition for relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In September 1992, Michael Bardo was arrested for the death and indecent assault of his three-year-old niece. Finding unanimously that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the jury determined that Bardo should be sentenced to death. The trial court accordingly imposed the death sentence, and in 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal. Bardo filed a timely PCRA petition. The Court was unanimous in affirming Docket No. 650 CAP, but was evenly divided on the appeal in Docket No. 651 CAP. Therefore, the grant of penalty phase relief was affirmed by operation of law. Part II of this opinion addressed Bardo's appeal of the PCRA court's order denying him guilt-phase relief (and several other penalty-phase claims). After careful review, the Court affirmed the denial of Bardo's guilt-phase claims for relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Bardo" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting a stay of execution, vacating appellee’s death sentence, and awarding a new penalty hearing under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Appellee was sentenced to death after being convicted of the 1986 robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. This was appellee's second murder conviction. After review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded Appellee did not prove that a timeliness exception applied to the filing of his petition for relief, and that the PCRA court erred in finding Appellee established his burden of proof under the "governmental interference" exception. The Supreme Court vacated the stay of execution and the grant of a new penalty phase, and reinstate appellee's death sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellee signed a contract in December 2010, to rent a car from Appellant Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia, LLC (“Enterprise”). She agreed in the contract that she would pay for repairs for any damage the car incurred during the rental period, along with any administrative, loss-of-use, and diminishment-in-value fees. The contract set forth formulas for calculating the loss-of-use and diminishment-in-value fees. It also contained a power-of-attorney clause allowing Enterprise to request payment for any unpaid “claims, damages, liabilities, or rental charges” directly from Appellee’s insurance carrier or credit card company. When Appellee returned the car following the rental, an Enterprise employee informed her that she was responsible for a scratch on the car. Enterprise later sent Appellee a letter with an estimate for repairs and an invoice for administrative, loss-of-use, and diminishment-of-value fees, for a total of $840.42. Appellee, represented by counsel, sued Enterprise, filing a six-count complaint that included a claim for damages under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law's ("UTPCPL) “catchall” provision. Appellee’s complaint alleged that Enterprise had engaged in deceptive acts and had made misrepresentations by charging her unconscionable fees bearing no reasonable relationship to the costs of repairing the alleged damage to the car. The Superior Court reversed as to Appellee’s UTPCPL claim, concluding that Appellee had sufficiently pled an “ascertainable loss.” The court considered Enterprise’s alleged threats to collect the $840.42 from Appellee’s auto insurance carrier and her credit card issuer, and Appellee’s hiring counsel to file suit to halt Enterprise’s collection efforts, to be sufficient to satisfy the “ascertainable loss” requirement. The court also pointed out that Enterprise had stipulated that it would cease its collection efforts only if the trial court granted its motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Enterprise argued that merely retaining an attorney to commence suit cannot satisfy the UTPCPL’s “ascertainable loss” element. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellee’s construction of the “ascertainable loss” element as including attorney fees was unreasonable, and contradicted by the plain language of the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Co of Phila." on Justia Law

D.C.D. was born in March 2011 to Mother C.Y.D. and Father J.T.W. Clinton County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) took custody of D.C.D. the following day because she suffered medical problems as a result of Mother’s drug use, presumably during her pregnancy. Although she was placed briefly with maternal relatives and another foster family, Child has lived most of her life with her current foster family. The trial court found that she has bonded with this family, who was willing to adopt her. In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court's holding that a termination of parental rights petition filed by CYS must be denied if the agency failed to employ “reasonable efforts” to reunify a child with her parent. The Supreme Court held that there were remedies available to a court faced with an agency which was not providing reasonable efforts, "refusing a properly proven termination of parental rights petition, and thus harming an innocent child, is not among them." Accordingly, the Court reversed the Superior Court and reinstated the trial court’s decision terminating father’s parental rights. View "In the Int of: D.C.D." on Justia Law

In this matter, Appellants John and Kathy St. John challenged the Superior Court’s decision to affirm a declaratory judgment order finding Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company (“Penn National”) liable for a judgment against its insured LPH Plumbing and Heating under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy in effect from July 1, 2003 to July 1, 2004. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether, under the facts of this case and the policy language at issue, Penn National was instead liable for the judgment against its insured under a separate policy of CGL insurance as well as a companion umbrella policy in effect from July 1, 2005 to July 1, 2006. Furthermore, the Court also considered whether the multiple trigger theory of liability insurance coverage (adopted by the Supreme Court in "J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.," 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993)), within the context of asbestos bodily injury claims applied in this case, where property damage was continuous and progressive, to trigger coverage under all policies in effect from exposure to the harmful condition to manifestation of the injury. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed all aspects of the lower court’s decision finding that coverage was triggered under the policy in effect from July 1, 2003 to July 1, 2004, when property damage became reasonably apparent, and declining to apply the multiple trigger theory of liability insurance coverage. View "PA Natl Mut Casualty v. St. John" on Justia Law