Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Attorney David Landay submitted to appellant Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., an "authorization" on behalf of an individual, requesting copies of the that person's pharmacy records. In response to the requests, Rite Aid sent invoices for $50 to both Landay and PC&G (collectively, "Appellees") for "professional services rendered." Appellees paid the invoices, and Rite Aid provided the requested copies of the pharmacy records. In 2010, Appellees filed a class action against Rite Aid. In Count I of the complaint, Appellees claimed that Rite Aid breached an implied agreement between the parties and Rite Aid that Rite Aid would provide copies of its records to its customers in a manner consistent with Pennsylvania law, limiting the amount that may be charged to the estimated actual and reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the reproduction of the requested records. Specifically, Appellees maintained that Rite Aid's act of charging a flat fee for the reproduction of records violated Section 6152(a)(2)(i) of the Medical Records Act (MRA). In Count II of their complaint, Appellees requested a declaratory judgment that the MRA prohibited Rite Aid from charging more than the reasonable expenses it incurred to reproduce the requested records, and, further, precluded Rite Aid from charging a flat fee. In this discretionary appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the MRA applied to the reproduction of records by pharmacies, and, if so, whether, and under what circumstances, pharmacies may charge customers a flat fee for the reproduction of records. The Court held that the Act did not apply to pharmacies, and, as a result, it did not address the flat fee issue. View "Landay v. Rite Aid" on Justia Law

In this capital case, Appellant Arthur Bomar appealed the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County that denied his petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Appellant was subsequently charged with first-degree murder, rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse for the 1997 death of Aimee Willard. While Appellant’s appeal from resentencing was pending, counsel from the Federal Community Defender Office (“FCDO”) for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Capital Habeas Unit filed on Appellant’s behalf a “Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief Pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution Statutory Post-Conviction Relief Under the Post-Conviction Relief Act [...],” which was deemed to be an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA proceedings were stayed pending the conclusion of Appellant’s direct appeal. The Superior Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on the remaining offenses, and the Supreme Court denied allocatur. Nine months later, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion seeking an order declaring Appellant incompetent to proceed. Following a hearing on the matter and briefing by both parties, the PCRA court found Appellant competent and denied the motion. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a response to Appellant’s PCRA petition on March 31, 2008, and evidentiary hearings on appellant’s petition took place on July 17, 2007, May 28, 2008, November 5-7, 2008, January 15-16, 2009, April 28-29, 2009, September 24, 2009, October 20-21, 2009, February 1-3, 2010, July 28, 2010, November 29, 2011, January 20, 2011, and November 29, 2011. The PCRA court ultimately denied Appellant’s petition on March 28, 2012. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 23, 2012, and, on September 4, 2012, the PCRA court filed an extensive 213 page opinion addressing, and rejecting as meritless, each of the 22 claims in Appellant’s PCRA petition. Of those claims, he raised nine to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error as alleged in any of appellant's nine claims, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of PCRA relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Bomar" on Justia Law

Appellant Harold Winston Noel, Jr., was convicted of robbery and related offenses, and sentenced to an aggregate 29 to 58 years’ imprisonment for these crimes. In this discretionary appeal, he did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, but instead insisted that the trial court’s failure to conduct voir dire in strict compliance with Rule 631 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure entitled him to a new trial. After careful consideration of appellant's argument on appeal and the prejudice it was alleged to have caused, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the jury selection process employed by the trial court. View "Pennsylvania v. Noel" on Justia Law

The issue this Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) appeal presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relative to counsel’s failure to seek suppression of an inculpatory post-polygraph statement made subsequent to a pre-polygraph counseled waiver defendant's Miranda rights. The PCRA court below denied relief. A divided Superior Court reversed and remanded in a 2-1 decision, in the process adopting and applying a test for measuring Miranda waivers devised by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit after the trial in this matter. The panel majority held that: (1) appellee’s prepolygraph Miranda waiver did not encompass the post-polygraph interview; (2) the Commonwealth failed to prove that appellee validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the post-polygraph interview; (3) appellee’s trial counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to seek suppression of the statement; and (4) the admission of the statement at trial was prejudicial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Superior Court’s approach led to an underlying merits holding that presented an important issue of first impression. After review of this case, the Court held that the Superior Court’s approach was flawed in multiple respects, requiring a remand to that court to reconsider the ineffectiveness claim under the proper review paradigm. Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and remanded for reconsideration of the issue. View "Pennsylvania v. Hill" on Justia Law

In 2003, appellant Fred Moran was an elected member of the Board of Commissioners of Haverford Township, Delaware County. The board decided to sell a 209-acre parcel of land on which the former Haverford State Mental Hospital was located. On December 19, 2005, the board held a special public meeting to address a looming revenue shortfall for the upcoming year. During the meeting, as Commissioner Andrew Lewis recalled in his trial testimony, appellant proposed accelerating the collection of real estate taxes as a way to raise revenue; particularly, he suggested having a consultant purchasing the a portion of the parcel, Goldenberg-Pohlig (GP) pre-pay $500,000 of the 2006 realty taxes on the parcel. The next day, Lewis and appellant had a phone conversation with Michael Lawry, a principal with GP. Lewis informed Lawry the board was addressing a budgetary shortfall and told him appellant had a proposal. Appellant then said to Lawry, “[C]all it extortion, call it what you will. We need $500,000, and we’ll accelerate the zoning. We’ll get you the zoning approvals you need and accelerate the process.” Lewis recalled Lawry asked whether the $500,000 was included in the $17.5 million, and appellant indicated it would be added to the purchase price. Lawry responded he was not in a position to answer but would discuss the matter with others at GP and get back in touch with appellant and Lewis. A few minutes later, Lewis called Lawry back and told him, “I want no part of that conversation. Haverford Township is not in the business of selling zoning.” Lewis testified he called appellant the next day and essentially told him the same thing. Appellant was charged with and later convicted for bribery in official and political matters. On appeal of that conviction, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, and also raised the question of whether bribery (as charged) was a strict liability crime. The Supreme Court concluded after review that bribery in official and political matters was not a strict liability crime, and that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction. View "Pennsylvania v. Moran" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed the reversal of appellee Willie Brooks' sentence and grant of a new trial. Appellee was appointed defense counsel after being charged with criminal attempt to commit homicide, possession of a firearm, possession of an instrument of crime, and loitering and prowling at night. After a pre-trial conference was continued six times, trial was set nearly two and a half years after appellee was originally charged. The day jury selection was to begin, appellee asked for leave to represent himself, and asked for a continuance to prepare his defense. The trial court surmised that appellee's latest request was a delaying tactic and denied the continuance. The Superior Court reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that it was error to deny appellee's last continuance request. The Commonwealth appealed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case, vacated the Superior Court's reversal, and reinstated appellee's conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Brooks" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Health (DOH) announced that, pursuant to an extensive reorganization of public health services referenced in Governor Tom Corbett’s 2013-2014 budget, twenty-six State Health Centers would be closed and approximately twenty-six nurse consultants would be furloughed. In response, a lawsuit was filed in Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction by Appellants SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, an unincorporated labor organization, five nurses employed by the Centers and represented by SEIU, and five Pennsylvania state legislators (collectively referred to as “SEIU”), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, SEIU sought to prevent Appellees, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Corbett, the DOH, and DOH Secretary, Michael Wolf, from closing the Centers and furloughing the nurse consultants. The Commonwealth Court denied the union's request. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found no reasonable ground for the denial of injunctive relief, and, accordingly, reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "SEIU Healthcare, et al v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Appellant Terry Taylor was sentenced for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (DUI), without a “full assessment for alcohol and drug addiction,” which is required “prior to sentencing” by Section 3814(2) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. sec. 3814(2). His sentence was imposed without consideration of the drug or alcohol treatment recommendations that an Assessment may have provided. Appellant, argued that he was entitled to have his sentence vacated, to be assessed in compliance with Section 3814(2), and to be resentenced after consideration of any treatment recommendations. The Superior Court rejected this argument, and upheld his judgment of sentence. Because the Supreme Court agreed with Appellant that the presentence requirement of Section 3814(2) was a mandatory component of the sentencing scheme for DUI offenders, and that a sentence imposed contrary to these requirements cannot stand, the Court reversed and remanded for resentencing after compliance with Sections 3804, 3814, and 3815 of the Vehicle Code. View "Pennsylvania v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In the Highland Garden neighborhood of the City of Chester, during the evening O'Neil Blackwood suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his head during a burglary of his home by three assailants who intended to steal cash and drugs from Victim. The assailants also assaulted his wife, while their young children were upstairs in the home. Mrs. Blackwood identified defendant Shaatan Adams as one of the assailants, although his face was covered by a clear or flesh-toned mask. Moreover, at trial, one of Defendant’s co-conspirators testified against him in exchange for a reduction of charges. A neighbor also testified to overhearing Defendant and the other assailants preparing for the crime. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the right against self-incrimination, as protected by the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions, was implicated when a Commonwealth witness, such as an investigating detective, testified without adverse implication that the defendant refused to answer questions prior to arrest. As observed in the majority opinion in "Commonwealth v. Molina,"( __ A.3d __ (J-55-2013) (Pa. 2014) addressing the question of whether an arguably exploited reference to a defendant’s pre-arrest silence violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination under the Pennsylvania Constitution), the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's conclusion that defendant’s constitutional rights, in this case, were not violated by the detective’s testimony in this case. View "Pennsylvania v. Adams" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Michael Molina of third degree murder and related crimes resulting from the savage beating of Melissa Snodgrass, apparently as a result of drug debts owed by Victim to Defendant. The victim told her mother, with whom she lived, that she was leaving the house to run some errands. When she did not return, the victim's mother reported her disappearance to the Missing Persons Unit of the Pittsburgh Police Department. Six months later, her decomposed remains were found under moldy clothing and other debris in the basement of a house in the Spring Garden section of Pittsburgh in which Michael Benintend, one of the prosecution’s primary witnesses, resided during the relevant time period. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the Missing Persons Unit detective’s testimony and the prosecutor’s closing arguments regarding the early days of the investigation into the victim's disappearance. Following a lead that Defendant was holding the victim against her will, the Missing Persons Unit detective assigned to the case went to Defendant’s house two days after Victim’s disappearance. Pamela Deloe, another prosecution witness, answered the door and asserted that neither the victim nor Defendant were at the house. Accordingly, the detective left her card and asked that Defendant call her. Later that day, Defendant called the detective. The detective then inquired as to when Defendant had last seen the victim. He initially responded that he had not seen her for a year and a half, but then he immediately contradicted his statement, claiming instead that he had not seen her for three months. Subsequent to this contradiction, the detective testified that she asked him to come to the police station to speak to her and he refused. The Supreme Court granted review in this case to consider whether a defendant’s right against self-incrimination is violated when the prosecution utilizes a non-testifying defendant’s pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt. This was an issue of first impression, to which the United States Supreme Court had not definitively spoken. The Pennsylvania Court agreed with the Superior Court, as well as several sister courts, that the use of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates a non-testifying defendant’s constitutional rights. The Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the Superior Court remanding for a new trial. However, given that the status of federal jurisprudence was uncertain, the Court based its holding in this case upon the right against self-incrimination set forth in Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. View "Pennsylvania v. Molina" on Justia Law