Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the appellants, Dr. Simon and Toby Galapo, placed signs with anti-hate and anti-racist messages on their property after a neighbor, Denise Oberholzer, called Dr. Galapo an anti-Semitic slur. The signs were visible from the Oberholzers' property and other neighbors' homes. The Oberholzers filed a civil complaint seeking to enjoin the signs, claiming they constituted a private nuisance, intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted a permanent injunction, ordering the Galapos to reposition the signs so they did not face the Oberholzers' property. The court found the signs severely impacted the Oberholzers' well-being and quiet enjoyment of their home. The court also determined the injunction was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction on speech.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the injunction, holding that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. The Superior Court concluded the injunction was content-neutral but remanded the case for the trial court to apply the more rigorous standard from Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., which requires that the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that the injunction constituted an impermissible prior restraint under Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court emphasized that the signs were pure speech on matters of public concern and that the trial court lacked the power to enjoin such speech. The Court also held that the publication of language giving rise to tort claims other than defamation cannot be enjoined under Article I, Section 7. The Court concluded that the signs did not invade the Oberholzers' substantial privacy interests in an essentially intolerable manner. View "Oberholzer v. Galapo" on Justia Law

Gary and Mary Wolfe own property in Muhlenberg Township, which includes a roofing business and several rental homes. Reading Blue Mountain and Northern Railroad Company (RBMN) sought to condemn a portion of the Wolfes' property to reestablish a rail siding to serve Russell Standard, an asphalt company. The Wolfes objected, arguing the taking was for a private benefit rather than a public purpose.The Berks County Court of Common Pleas sustained the Wolfes' objections, finding the condemnation was intended solely to benefit Russell Standard and not the public. The court noted that the rail siding would disrupt the Wolfes' property and existing businesses, and that Russell Standard could use its own property for the rail connection. RBMN's refusal to consider alternative routes further indicated a private benefit.The Commonwealth Court reversed, relying on older case law that generally supported railroad takings for public use. The panel presumed RBMN's taking was for a public purpose, emphasizing the historical importance of railroads in serving public needs.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The Court held that the taking did not serve a public purpose as required by the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the public must be the primary and paramount beneficiary of the taking, which was not demonstrated in this case. The evidence showed the taking primarily benefited Russell Standard, with no significant public advantage. The Court remanded the case for reinstatement of the trial court's order dismissing the condemnation action. View "Wolfe v. Reading Blue Mountain" on Justia Law

Thomas E. Bold, Jr. was found unconscious behind the wheel of his legally parked car in a mall parking lot. The car's engine was running, and the headlights were on. When roused by Officer Thomas Gelnett, Bold appeared intoxicated and admitted to drinking at a nearby bar. He intended to sleep in his car until he was fit to drive. Bold was arrested for DUI and refused a blood test at a medical facility. Consequently, PennDOT suspended his license for 18 months due to his refusal.Bold appealed the suspension in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas. During the hearing, Officer Gelnett admitted there was no evidence that Bold had driven the car while intoxicated. The court initially upheld the suspension but later reversed its decision, finding no reasonable grounds to believe Bold was in control of the vehicle's movement. The court cited the case Solomon v. PennDOT, which found insufficient grounds for suspicion when a suspect was found sleeping in a parked car with the engine running.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Bold was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The court relied on past cases where the presence of a driver in a running vehicle was deemed sufficient for reasonable grounds. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the circumstances did not provide reasonable grounds to believe Bold was operating or in actual physical control of the vehicle's movement. The court emphasized that the implied consent law requires some objective evidence of control over the vehicle's movement. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's ruling, siding with Bold. View "Bold v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

On December 3, 2017, Yuguang Lin and Ruan “Katie” Wenting were robbed by three masked men who took their belongings and forced entry into their apartment, stealing money, cigarettes, and cigars. The police tracked Lin’s stolen cell phone to a vehicle where they found Shaquan Lewis and Raheem Stevenson (Appellant) along with the stolen items. Appellant was charged with robbery, burglary, and criminal conspiracy.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County held a jury trial where Appellant decided to testify. Before he took the stand, his counsel made an oral motion in limine to exclude a 2005 burglary conviction, arguing its remoteness. The trial court denied the motion, ruling the conviction admissible. Appellant then preemptively disclosed the conviction during his testimony. The jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to eight to sixteen years of incarceration followed by ten years of probation. Appellant’s post-sentence motion challenging the admissibility ruling was denied, and he appealed to the Superior Court.The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Appellant forfeited his right to challenge the admissibility of the prior conviction by introducing it himself. The court relied on Commonwealth v. Conner and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ohler v. United States, which held that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction cannot claim error on appeal.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and disagreed with the Superior Court. It held that a defendant does not waive the right to appeal a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction by preemptively introducing the evidence following an adverse in limine ruling. The court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The case involves the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) developing a rulemaking package to join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from power plants. The RGGI Regulation faced opposition from the Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) and other state officials, leading to litigation. Three nonprofit environmental organizations (Nonprofits) sought to intervene in the litigation to defend the RGGI Regulation, citing environmental and health concerns.The Commonwealth Court initially denied the Nonprofits' application to intervene, ruling that their interests were adequately represented by DEP. The court also granted a preliminary injunction against the RGGI Regulation. Nonprofits appealed both the denial of intervention and the preliminary injunction.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. It found that the Nonprofits had established a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation, based on the testimony of their members regarding the adverse health and environmental impacts of CO2 emissions. The court determined that DEP did not adequately represent the Nonprofits' interests, particularly because DEP had not invoked the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) in its defense of the RGGI Regulation.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision denying the Nonprofits' application to intervene, allowing them to participate as parties in the ongoing litigation. However, the appeal from the preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot because the Commonwealth Court had already issued a permanent injunction against the RGGI Regulation, superseding the preliminary injunction. View "Shirley v. PA Legislative Reference Bureau" on Justia Law

Stadium Casino RE, LLC ("Stadium") contested the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board's ("Board") decision to award a Category 4 slot machine license to SC Gaming OpCo, LLC and Ira Lubert (collectively "SC Gaming"). Stadium argued that Lubert's bid was invalid because it was funded by individuals not authorized to participate in the auction, and that the Board should have awarded the right to apply for the license to Stadium as the second-highest bidder or conducted another auction.The Commonwealth Court initially reviewed the case, where Stadium sought declarations that Lubert's bid was invalid and that the Board lacked authority to consider SC Gaming's application. Stadium also sought an injunction to stop the Board from considering SC Gaming's application and requested a mandamus order to allow Stadium to apply for the license or to conduct another auction. The Board and SC Gaming filed preliminary objections, which the Commonwealth Court overruled, ordering them to file answers. Meanwhile, the Board proceeded with SC Gaming's licensing application, allowing Stadium to intervene but denying its discovery requests. The Board ultimately granted SC Gaming's application and issued an adjudication supporting its decision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on whether the Board exceeded its statutory authority and failed to comply with mandatory directives in the Gaming Act. The Court found that the Board had the authority to conduct the auction and licensing proceedings and that Section 1305.2(c) of the Gaming Act did not impose jurisdictional limitations on the Board's ability to act. The Court held that the Board's procedures and findings, including the determination that SC Gaming was wholly owned by Lubert, were within its discretion and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Board's decision to award the license to SC Gaming and dismissed the action pending in the Commonwealth Court as moot. View "Stadium Casino RE, LLC v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

AUUE, Inc. applied for a zoning permit to develop a medical center, including a hospital, medical clinic, and professional offices, on five parcels of land in Jefferson Hills Borough. The Borough's Zoning Officer issued a use permit, recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the Office Park District (O-P District), but conditioned the permit on AUUE obtaining further approvals before any development could commence. Residents of Jefferson Hills appealed, arguing that the application violated several provisions of the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance.The Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) overturned the Zoning Officer’s decision, concluding that the proposed medical center was not permitted by right in the O-P District and that the Zoning Officer exceeded his authority by issuing a permit without ensuring full compliance with the Ordinance. The ZHB identified several violations in the application, including improper use of accessory parking lots and lack of direct access to a collector or arterial road.The Commonwealth Court reversed the ZHB’s decision, holding that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit recognizing the proposed use as allowed by right in the O-P District. The court found that the ZHB should have limited its review to whether the proposed use was permitted by right, rather than considering overall compliance with the Ordinance.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit for the limited purpose of recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the O-P District. The ZHB was required to limit its review to this issue and was not permitted to overturn the Zoning Officer’s decision based on other potential violations of the Ordinance. View "AUUE, Inc. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills" on Justia Law

In a case involving the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was asked to determine whether the PLCB is a "person" under Section 8303 of the Judicial Code and, if so, whether sovereign immunity bars mandamus damages sought under that provision. The case arose from the PLCB's failure to implement procedures to facilitate the direct shipment of special orders to customers, as required by law. The Commonwealth Court had issued a declaratory judgment to that effect and a writ of mandamus compelling the PLCB to comply. The Wine Vendors and Log Cabin subsequently applied for mandamus damages under Section 8303, which the PLCB contested, arguing that it was not a "person" under the statute and that sovereign immunity barred such damages.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the PLCB is a "person" within the meaning of Section 8303 and that sovereign immunity does not bar mandamus damages available under that provision. The court also held that attorneys’ fees awarded in relation to Section 8303 are not barred by sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the holdings of the Commonwealth Court and remanded for further proceedings. View "MFW WINE CO., LLC v. PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, Bobbi Ann Mertis filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dong-Joon Oh, North American Partners in Anesthesia (Pennsylvania), LLC (NAPA), Wilkes-Barre Hospital, and Commonwealth Health. Mertis alleged that Dr. Oh negligently administered a femoral nerve block, causing her a femoral nerve injury. Dr. Oh retained a law firm, Scanlon, Howley & Doherty, to represent him. Later, Dr. Eugene Kim, the orthopedic surgeon who performed Mertis’s knee surgery and was not named as a defendant, also retained the same law firm after receiving a subpoena to appear at a discovery deposition.The Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denied Mertis's motion for sanctions to disqualify the law firm from representing Dr. Oh and to bar the firm's further ex parte communication with Dr. Kim. The court found no violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.6, which regulates obtaining information from a party's treating physician. Mertis appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. The Superior Court found that Rule 4003.6 was violated and that the law firm's concurrent representation of Dr. Oh and Dr. Kim was tantamount to ex parte communication.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court concluded that a law firm representing a defendant treating physician cannot obtain information from a nonparty treating physician without the patient's written consent or through an authorized method of discovery. The court found that the client exception in Rule 4003.6(1) does not permit a law firm to obtain information from a nonparty treating physician by entering into an attorney-client relationship with that physician when the law firm's attorneys were already prohibited from obtaining information from that physician under Rule 4003.6 prior to entering such attorney-client relationship. View "Mertis v. Oh" on Justia Law

The appellant, Michael John Parrish, was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and received two death sentences. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his judgment of sentence in 2013. In 2014, Parrish filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County. The PCRA court denied Parrish’s petition twice, and on both occasions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case back to the PCRA court for further proceedings.The PCRA court denied Parrish's petition for a third time. Parrish appealed again, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case back to the PCRA court once more. Parrish then decided to withdraw his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to consult with him about his direct appeal rights. The PCRA court granted Parrish's request to withdraw the claim and dismissed it. Parrish appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the PCRA court's directive to Parrish to file another Rule 1925(b) statement was superfluous. The court also found that the Commonwealth and the court itself were significantly hampered in their ability to assess Parrish’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to the lack of a PCRA court record or ruling on these claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case back to the PCRA court to further develop the record and consider Parrish’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Parrish" on Justia Law