Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The primary question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a municipal authority could exercise its eminent domain powers to condemn an easement over privately-owned land, where the sole purpose of the easement is to supply a private developer with land to install sewer drainage facilities needed for a proposed private residential subdivision. "While this determination may seem to interfere with the ability of municipal water and/or sewer authorities to expand their operations under circumstances where, as here, there is an overarching nexus between the taking and private development, it is not this Court’s function to ameliorate such difficulties by departing from the statutory text. [. . .] The Legislature’s decision to exempt regulated public utilities, but not municipal authorities, from the preclusive rule set forth in Section 204(a) demonstrates that it intended to allow – within constitutional limitations – the continued use of eminent domain for the provision of public services such as water and sewer access in tandem with private development for a limited, defined class of condemnors. As RAWA is not within that class, its condemnation of the drainage easement is in violation of PRPA." View "Reading Area Wat Auth v. Schuyl River Grwy, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant Jakeem Towles and Antwain Robinson took a bus from Lancaster to Columbia to visit appellant's cousin, Tyrone Hunter, and to attend a local rap performance at a venue near Hunter's apartment. Appellant and Robinson drank alcohol and smoked marijuana over the course of the night, walking between Hunter’s apartment and the venue several times. At some point, appellant took Hunter’s handgun from his apartment and hid it in a nearby alley. At the venue, appellant interrupted Cornell Stewart and John Wright's rap performance by grabbing Wright's microphone. As a result, appellant and Wright got into a physical altercation wherein Wright hit appellant at least once. Security separated them, and escorted appellant and Robinson out the front door and Wright and Stewart out the back. Appellant immediately retrieved the handgun he hid earlier, went behind the venue, and fired three shots at Wright and Stewart. One of the shots fatally struck Stewart in the head. Appellant and Robinson fled the scene and asked a friend for a ride to Lancaster. During the trip, appellant made incriminating statements to all occupants of the vehicle, including Robinson, their friend, and two other women, and instructed them not to talk. Appellant was charged with Stewart’s homicide, the attempted homicide of Wright, and unlawful possession of a firearm (the unlawful possession charge was severed for trial). The Commonwealth filed notice of an aggravating circumstance and intent to seek the death penalty. At trial, appellant’s defense theory was to negate specific intent to kill by arguing he was in the heat of passion from the altercation with Wright and also had diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication. The jury convicted appellant of first degree murder and attempted homicide. In the penalty phase, the jury found one aggravating circumstance: in the commission of the murder, appellant created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to Stewart. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court must affirm a death sentence unless it finds: (i) the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance; or (ii) the sentence was the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed appellant's death sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Towles" on Justia Law

In 1989, a group of boys was throwing snowballs at passing cars in a Philadelphia neighborhood. One of the snowballs struck a vehicle driven by Appellant Anthony Reid, who was also known as “Tone” or “Tone-Bey.” Appellant stopped his vehicle, and he and his two passengers exited the car. The boys scattered, and Appellant asked two bystanders if they were involved in throwing the snowballs. The bystanders denied involvement, and, as Appellant reached his hand inside his jacket, he replied “You better hope none was your family.” Appellant and his passengers drove around the block looking for the boys who had been throwing snowballs. When Appellant reached the stop sign, he drove the car onto the sidewalk and gunfire erupted from the passenger side of the vehicle. Michael Waters was fatally wounded. Six days later, in a separate incident, Appellant used a 10-millimeter handgun to kill Neal Wilkinson. In this incident, Appellant and a companion, Kevin Bowman, asked Wilkinson and Darryl Woods to accompany them to collect a debt. When Wilkinson and Woods ascended the stairs to the residence of the alleged debtor, Bowman shot them both with a shotgun, and Appellant then shot both men with a handgun. Woods survived and gave police a statement naming Appellant as one of the two shooters. Ten-millimeter shell casings found at the scene of the Wilkinson murder were determined to have been fired from the same gun that was used in the Waters murder six days earlier. The trial court formally imposed a death sentence on the murder conviction, and a consecutive aggregate sentence of 10-20 years imprisonment on remaining offenses. Appellant sought post-conviction relief, but was denied. Finding no reason to overturn the PCRA Court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Reid" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Reid was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, carrying a firearm without a license, possessing an instrument of crime, and criminal conspiracy stemming from the 1988 murder of Mark Lisby. Appellant was ultimately sentenced to death for the first-degree murder conviction, 2.5 to 5 years for possession of an instrument of crime, 2.5 to 5 years for carrying a firearm without a license, and 5 to 10 years for criminal conspiracy. Appellant filed for post-conviction relief, and was denied. He appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court's denial of relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Reid" on Justia Law

On March 7, 2012, Sean Donahue submitted a Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) request via email to the Office of the Governor (OG), seeking various budgetary and employment records. OG’s open-records officer did not receive the request until March 12, 2012; and five business days later, on March 19, 2012, the open-records officer proceeded to grant Donahue’s request in part. On March 29, 2012, Donahue appealed to the Office of Open Records (OOR). OOR determined that Donahue’s request was "deemed denied" because OG failed to respond to the request within a five business day period as required by 65 P.S. section 67.901. Even though OG prevailed in the matter before OOR, it appealed OOR’s final order to the Commonwealth Court, where it contested OOR’s interpretation of Section 901 of the RTKL. OG contended that OOR wrongly concluded that an agency must respond to a RTKL request within five business days from the date any person within the agency receives such a request. The OG argued that an agency, including it, has five business days to respond from the date its RTKL open-records officer receives the request for records. The Commonwealth Court issued a per curiam order quashing OG’s petition for appellate review. The Commonwealth Court held that OG lacked standing to appeal from the OOR order because OG was not "aggrieved" by the order, but merely disagreed with an issue decided against it regarding the time frame for responding to RTKL records requests. In addition to appealing OOR’s final order, OG simultaneously filed a declaratory judgment action in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking a declaration that OOR misinterpreted Section 901 of the RTKL with respect to the commencement of the five business day period for responding to a RTKL request under Section 901.3. Finding no reversible error in the Commonwealth Court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Governor's Office v. Office of Open Records" on Justia Law

Given time constraints associated with an impending primary election contest, this election appeal was previously resolved in per curiam Order of the Supreme Court. With the exigency abated, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took an opportunity to supplement its brief explanation provided in the earlier Order. The Court determined that Pennsylvania courts are not empowered to employ principles of equity to override the express statutory command that the failure of a candidate for statewide public office to file a timely statement of financial interests with the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission "shall . . . be a fatal defect to a petition to appear on the ballot." On March 10, 2014, Robert Guzzardi filed a timely nomination petition with the Department of State, seeking placement of his name on the ballot for the Republican nomination for the Office of Governor. Although an original statement of financial interests was appended to his petition, Mr. Guzzardi failed to make the mandatory tender to the Ethics Commission prior to the statutory deadline. Appellants, qualified electors and registered voters, filed a petition to set the nomination petition aside in the Commonwealth Court. Among other challenges, they invoked the statutory fatal-defect rule which, by its plain terms, required Mr. Guzzardi’s name to be removed from the primary election ballot, in light of his undisputed failure to file a timely statement of financial interests with the Ethics Commission. The Commonwealth Court, however, refused to enforce the governing legislative directive. Rather, the single judge administering the matter conducted a hearing and issued an order denying Appellants’ objections. In an unpublished opinion, she relied on a line of Commonwealth Court decisions which have found the judiciary to be possessed with the power to permit a fatal defect to be "cured" through the application of equitable principles: it was the court’s position that Mr. Guzzardi had offered sufficient, non-negligent explanations to justify treating his late-filed statement nunc pro tunc, or as if it had been submitted to the Ethics Commission on time. "[T]here is no dispute here that the statutory fatal-defect rule applied squarely in Mr. Guzzardi’s circumstances, on account of his failure to timely file a statement of financial interests with the Commission. Moreover, Appellants lodged timely objections to his nomination petition, bringing the matter squarely before the Commonwealth Court. In the circumstances, the Commonwealth Court erred in refusing to enforce the governing statutory command." View "In Re: Nomination of Guzzardi" on Justia Law

Following remand in this capital case, the Commonwealth appealed the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County's order granting Appellee Richard Hackett's petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). After determining that Appellee proved he was "mentally retarded" and thus, exempt from execution in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Atkins v. Virginia," (536 U.S. 304 (2002)), the PCRA court set aside Appellee's death sentence. As the PCRA court made findings which were not supported by substantial evidence of record and made an error of law by improperly equating borderline intellectual functioning with mental retardation (intellectual disability), the Supreme Court reversed the PCRA court's order vacating Appellee's death sentence and dismissed his petition for collateral relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Hackett" on Justia Law

In September 2003, appellant The Cutler Group, Inc. sold a new house in Bucks County to Davey and Holly Fields. After living in the house for three years, the Fields sold the house to appellees Michael and Deborah Conway. In 2008, Appellees discovered water infiltration around some of the windows in the home, and, after consultation with an engineering and architectural firm, concluded that the infiltration was caused by several construction defects. In 2011, Appellees filed a one-count complaint against Appellant, alleging that its manner of construction breached the home builders' implied warranty of habitability. Appellant filed a demurrer, arguing, inter alia, that, as a matter of law, the warranty rextended from the builder only to the first purchaser of a newly constructed home because there was no contractual relationship between the builder and second or subsequent purchasers of the home. Recognizing that courts have traditionally required a showing of privity of contract before permitting a party to proceed with a warranty claim, the trial court concluded that the question presented was "one of policy as to who will bear the burden for damages caused by latent defects [in] relatively new residential dwellings." The trial court sustained Appellant's demurer based on lack of privity, and dismissed Appellees' complaint with prejudice. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Superior Court, appellees petitioned the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a subsequent purchaser of a previously inhabited residence may not recover contract damages for breach of the builder's implied warranty of habitability. View "Conway v. The Cutler Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Residential Warranty Corporation, Integrity Underwriters, Charles Rubendall and Keefer, Wood, Allen & Rahal, LLP filed suit in Dauphin County against appellees Alexander Bratic and Joseph Proko. The Keefer firm represented Residential and Integrity in that lawsuit, which alleged tortious interference with a contractual relationship. The case ended when the trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment. Appellees then sued appellants in Philadelphia County, asserting wrongful use of civil proceedings and common-law abuse-of-process claims based on the earlier dismissed suit. Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d)(1), appellants petitioned to transfer the case to Dauphin County based on forum non conveniens, alleging the pertinent "witnesses and evidence are located in Dauphin County such that depositions and trial in Philadelphia County will be a hardship to the [appellants] and the witnesses upon whom [appellants] must rely." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to clarify the requirements for transfers based on forum non conveniens. Based on the facts in record of this case, the Court found the trial court's proper consideration of the totality of the evidence justified the order to transfer the case. "Trial courts are vested with considerable discretion when ruling on such a motion, and '[i]f there exists any proper basis for the trial court's decision to transfer venue, the decision must stand.'" View "Bratic v. Rubendall " on Justia Law

Wes and Cynthia Collier lived in a home in Scranton, Pennsylvania with their children and step-children: 16-year-old Leslie Collier; 19-year-old Samantha Hintz; 22-year-old Dustin Hintz; and 22-year-old Matthew Collier, who was handicapped and could not walk. Appellee, then 25-years-old, moved into the Collier home. At the time, he and Samantha were boyfriend and girlfriend, and they lived in her bedroom. Between May and June 2008, Samantha and Appellee were no longer getting along, so Appellee was given his own bedroom in the basement. Appellee became angry when he found Justin Berrios, age 22, Samantha’s former boyfriend and the father of her 2-year-old child Tristan, sitting on Samantha’s bed with her. After working their shifts, Samantha gave Appellee a ride home. Appellee left for a friend’s house, and Cynthia retired for the evening at 11:00 p.m. In the early hours of July 17, 2008, Appellee returned to the Collier home and stabbed Justin to death. When police arrived at the house, they found Samantha, Cynthia and Matthew bound. Samantha had been assaulted; Justin, Leslie and Dustin were dead. Appellee was charged with three counts each of first-degree murder, second-degree murder and third-degree murder, robbery, indecent assault and kidnapping, and convicted by jury on all counts. A three-judge panel of the Superior Court, in relevant part, unanimously determined the facts were insufficient to sustain the kidnapping charge, and, as a result, the second-degree murder convictions. The Commonwealth appealed the Superior Court's judgment. Finding that the victims, although imprisoned in their home, nevertheless, were confined in a place of isolation, satisfied the Commonwealth’s definition of kidnapping. Thus, the Superior Court was reversed and the trial court's judgments of sentence reinstated. View "Pennsylvania v. Rushing" on Justia Law