Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from the liquidation proceedings of Reliance Insurance Company. One of Reliance's policyholders, Warrantech Consumer Products Services, Inc., submitted various proofs of claim seeking reimbursement under two insurance policies in which Reliance agreed to indemnify Warrantech for all future liabilities arising under certain warranty/service contracts Warrantech entered during the applicable policy period. The Commonwealth Court denied Warrantech's claims, holding that 40 P.S. 221.21 of the Insurance Department Act applied to terminate coverage for all "risks in effect" under a policy of insurance no later than thirty days after the respective insurer enters liquidation, notwithstanding that the relevant policies of insurance were cancelled prior to the date of liquidation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's judgment. View "Warrantech v. Reliance Ins Co." on Justia Law

In August, 2010, Appellants, Washington County residents Raymond and Donna Mantia, hired Appellee, West Virginia contractor Shafer Electric & Construction, to build a 34 foot by 24 foot, two-car garage addition onto their house. The proposals for the garage did not comply with several requirements of Section 517.7 of the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act. Specifically, any home improvement contract, in order to be valid and enforceable against the owner of real property, had to be legible, in writing, and contain thirteen other specific requirements. Despite the detail in the specifications for the work to be completed, the contract here only complied with subsections (5), (7), and (8) of Section 517.7(a). Notwithstanding these deficiencies, work on the project began in October, 2010, when Appellants, who owned their own excavation business, began the foundation excavation. When Appellee commenced construction of the addition, it contended that problems surfaced because of Appellants' failure to complete the excavation work properly. During the subsequent months, Appellants eventually reexcavated the foundation area for the addition and, in the process (according to Appellee), changed the design of the addition several times. Negotiations into these design changes and other necessary alterations as a result of the excavation problems occurred, but ultimately failed when Appellants apparently refused to enter into a new contract with Appellee. Upon the breakdown of the negotiations, the parties mutually agreed that Appellee would invoice Appellants for the work completed, and that Appellee would discontinue efforts on the project. Appellants refused to pay the bill. Appellee responded by filing a mechanic's lien in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas. When Appellants still had failed to satisfy the outstanding balance, Appellee filed a civil action in the common pleas court, alleging both breach of contract and quantum meruit causes of action. The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine whether the Act barred a contractor from recovery under a theory of quantum meruit in the absence of a valid and enforceable home improvement contract as defined by the Act. The Superior Court held that the Act did not bar a cause of action sounding in quantum meruit and, for slightly different reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shafer Electric & Construction v. Mantia" on Justia Law

In February, 2006, Konstantinos Koumboulis shot and killed his wife and himself inside his house. The murder/suicide was highly publicized in the local media and on the internet. The Jaconos purchased the property from the Koumboulis estate at auction in September, 2006, for $450,000. After investing thousands in renovations, the Jaconos listed the property for sale in June, 2007. They informed Re/Max, their listing agents, of the murder/suicide. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court for review was whether the occurrence of a murder/suicide inside a house constituted a material defect of the property, such that appellees' failure to disclose the same to the buyer of the house constituted fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law's (UTPCPL). The Court concluded a murder/suicide does not constitute an actionable material defect. View "Milliken v. Jacono" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia filed an Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit with the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections ("L&I") for conversion of the Nativity B.V.M. Elementary School into a 63-unit, one-bedroom apartment complex for low income senior citizens. The school was built in 1912 and operated by the Archdiocese in legal non-conformance with subsequently enacted zoning codes until 2008, when it had been closed due to declining enrollment and insufficient revenue. In 2009, the Archdiocese received funding under the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to convert the school to senior housing. L&I denied the Archdiocese's Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit as not in compliance with several provisions of the Philadelphia Zoning Code. The Archdiocese appealed to the City of Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment ("ZBA") for use and dimensional variances. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth Court applied an improper standard in reversing the ZBA's grant of a variance. After careful review of the Commonwealth Court's opinion the Court concluded that the court erred by relying on an improper standard for unnecessary hardship and by substituting its judgment for that of the ZBA, thereby applying an incorrect standard of review. View "Marshall v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Andre Leonti, a resident of Fayette County, died intestate in 2006. Thereafter, Cheryl Keefer, a purported friend of Decedent, filed a petition with the Register for the grant of letters of administration which listed the heirs and personal assets of Decedent as "unknown" and indicated that there was no real estate. The Register refused to grant letters to Keefer because she did not have Decedent's death certificate, was not his next of kin, and, therefore, was not a person entitled to letters. Keefer, through her attorney, filed a petition to authorize the Register to issue letters to her without producing a death certificate and further directing the Mon Valley Hospital to release the Decedent's remains for a funeral and burial. Keefer attached a purported copy of a power of attorney executed by Decedent. No one contested this petition, and, on the same day the petition was filed, the orphan's court issued an order authorizing and directing the Register to issue letters "without the necessity of requiring a death certificate," and further ordering and directing the Hospital to release Decedent's remains to Keefer for funeral and burial. In compliance with this order, the Register issued letters to Keefer, but did not secure a bond from her. Several months later, Keefer filed with the Register an inventory of the estate. One month later, Appellee Elvira Dorsey, a resident of Texas who claimed to be Decedent's niece, became aware of Decedent's estate, and alleged she was the sole surviving heir of Decedent. Appellee petitioned for Keefer's removal as administratrix. The orphan's court granted Appellee's petition, issued an order, and required Keefer to deliver to Appellee the custody and possession of Decedent's estate's assets. Keefer, however, did not deliver the assets of the estate to Appellee. The orphan's court issued an order holding Keefer in contempt, sentencing Keefer to six months imprisonment, and directing that a verdict be entered in favor of Appellee and against Keefer in the amount of $192,769.19. Appellee filed praecipes for entry of judgment with the Fayette County Prothonotary and the Register to enter judgment against Keefer. Appellee then filed a complaint against the Register, individually, and Western Surety Company, alleging that the Register and Surety were liable for damages resulting from the Register's failure to secure bonding, which, Appellee asserted, was required by law. In this appeal by allowance, the primary issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the applicability of governmental and official immunity with respect to a claim alleging a violation of bonding requirements mandated under the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code ("PEF Code"). Ultimately, the Court held that the General Assembly intended that 20 Pa.C.S.A. 3172 created a targeted form of accountability for such registers, resting outside the scope of governmental and official immunity. Therefore, the Fayette County Register of Wills was not immune under the Tort Claims Act from liability for an alleged violation of Section 3172. The case was remanded back to the orphan's court for an assessment of the applicability of the the immunity defense, and for a more developed factual record. View "Dorsey v. Redman" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the proper allocation of the burden of proof between an employer and a workers' compensation claimant regarding the injured employee's legal eligibility under federal immigration law to obtain suitable employment whenever the employer seeks to suspend workers' compensation disability benefits. The Court held that in this case, the Commonwealth Court correctly determined that Appellant, Kennett Square Specialties bore the burden to prove that the loss of earning power of its employee, David Cruz, was due to his lack of United States citizenship or other legal work authorization in order to obtain a suspension of his workers' compensation disability benefits. Furthermore, the Court held that Claimant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when questioned at the hearing before the Workers' Compensation Judge did not constitute substantial evidence of his alleged lack of legal authorization to be employed in the United States, and thus could not, standing alone, furnish sufficient evidence for the WCJ to suspend Claimant's benefits. View "Cruz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board" on Justia Law

In 2009, two officers on patrol in a marked police vehicle saw appellant and another male sitting on the steps of a vacant building in south Philadelphia. The officers approached the men to question their reason for loitering there, as a large number of burglaries had been reported in the area. Appellant Haleem Lyles stated his grandmother lived on the block. One officer asked for appellant’s identification, which appellant gave him. When the officer began writing down the identification information, he saw appellant place his hand in his right pocket and turn his right side away from the officer’s view; the officer told appellant to stop reaching and remove his hand. Concerned appellant might be reaching for a concealed weapon, the officer instructed him to remove his hand a second time. When appellant reached into the pocket a third time, the officer placed appellant against the wall of the building to conduct a safety frisk for weapons. Appellant once again put his hand in the pocket, so the officer forcibly removed it, and a plastic bag containing blue packets filled with crack cocaine became visible. The officer handcuffed appellant and seized the plastic bag. The officer then searched appellant and discovered a bag containing marijuana in appellant’s left pocket. Appellant was charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the drugs, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the Superior Court properly reversed the trial court’s suppression of evidence, which was based on a finding that an officer’s request for identification elevated an encounter to an investigative detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. View "Pennsylvania v. Lyles" on Justia Law

Appellee’s lengthy criminal record spans 14 pages with a total of 228 charges, terminating in four convictions, four guilty pleas, fourteen withdrawals, fifty-three dismissals, forty-four nolle prosequi, three transfers to family court, sixteen acquittals, five sustained demurrers, thirty transfers to the juvenile division, and fifty-five held for court. Between April 2010 and January 2011, Appellee filed eight separate pro se petitions in Philadelphia under the name Mark Wallace, or one of his aliases, Mark Green or James Smith, seeking destruction of fingerprints, photographs, and arrest records from past charges that had not resulted in convictions. The Commonwealth estimated that Appellee sought in total the expungement of approximately 150 charges. After determining that hearings were unnecessary, the trial court denied each of Appellee’s eight petitions in separate orders issued from May 2010 to March 2011. Appellee appealed each denial to the Superior Court, which consolidated the eight appeals and ultimately reversed the trial court in a published opinion. Having rejected the trial court’s analysis, the Superior Court concluded that “some of Appell[ee]’s non-conviction arrest records may be eligible for expungement.” However, due to confusion from the record at hand, the Superior Court was unable to determine which specific charges might be subject to expungement, and so the court remanded to the trial court for clarification. The Commonwealth filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court on the whether the Superior Court erred by holding that an incarcerated career criminal had a due process right to a hearing at which the trial court must determine - on a charge by charge basis - whether over a hundred prior criminal charges against him should be expunged. Because the trial court’s findings "are sound and strongly supported by the record," the Supreme Court found "no reason to disturb the trial court’s holdings." The Supreme Court found that an inmate did not have the right to petition for expungment while incarcerated. Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court reversing the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County was vacated and the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County were reinstated. View "Pennsylvania v. Wallace" on Justia Law

In 2011, while driving home from a funeral reception, Appellee William Bell crossed the center line of a road and struck another vehicle. A woman was killed as a result of the impact. Following trial, Bell was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance-bac.16+, homicide by vehicle while DUI, and homicide by vehicle, In this appeal, the Supreme Court addressed questions of whether convictions for homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence (DUI) merged for operating privilege suspension purposes under the Vehicle Code, and, more generally, whether the criminal doctrine of merger was applicable to the collateral civil consequences which flow from merged, underlying criminal convictions. The Court held that the Commonwealth Court improperly found the criminal doctrine of merger was applicable in the civil arena of operating privilege suspensions under 75 Pa.C.S. sections 1532(a), (a.1). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Bell v. Bureau of Driver Licensing" on Justia Law

Appellant Kenneth Hairston was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death for each count. He failed to file a timely post-conviction motion or appeal, and thereby waived any claims of error. The Supreme Court automatically reviewed the case, evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions, and the sentences appellants receive. The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's convictions and sentence. Appellant thereafter moved for reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc. After the trial court granted appellant's motion, he raised numerous claims of error at trial relating to his convictions. Upon consideration of those claims, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and reaffirmed his convictions and death sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Hairston" on Justia Law