Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A Pittsburgh police officer on foot patrol came upon Appellant Duane Jemison, Jr.'s car which was parked improperly in a legally marked handicapped parking spot. Upon running the car's license plate number, the officer discovered that the car had been carjacked a few days before. As other officers arrived at the scene, Appellant entered the car and started to drive away, but was immediately stopped by a police vehicle in his path. The officers ordered Appellant to get out of the car. Rather than complying immediately, Appellant moved one of his hands downward toward the floorboard, where one of the officers then observed a gun. After a search, officers recovered a gun with the hammer back, the safety off, and a round in the chamber from the floor of the vehicle. Appellant was charged with persons not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, resisting arrest, and two counts of receiving stolen property. He was tried by jury for persons not to possess a firearm, after this charge had been severed from the others. To establish Appellant's guilt of this charge, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Appellant had been previously convicted of a statutorily enumerated offense that barred him from possessing a firearm, and that he had, indeed, possessed a firearm. It was undisputed that, in 2008, Appellant had been convicted of robbery, and the Commonwealth sought to introduce at trial the evidence of this robbery conviction. However, Appellant sought to stipulate only that he had been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses, without stating that the specific offense was robbery. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the continued viability of "Commonwealth v. Stanley," (446 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1982)), where the Court held that the prosecution was not required to accept a defendant's offer to stipulate to the fact of a prior conviction when the conviction was an element of the offense charged. Concluding that "Stanley" remained good law despite the United States Supreme Court's holding in "Old Chief v. United States," (519 U.S. 172 (1997)), the Pennsylvania Court affirmed the Superior Court's order affirming Appellant's sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Jemison Jr." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission filed a petition for review of an order of the supervising judge of the Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury (Dauphin County) which denied the Commission’s motion for a protective order seeking to prohibit the Office of Attorney General from reviewing allegedly privileged or protected communications between the Commission and its counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the Commission's petition. View "In Re: 33rd Statewide Investigating Grand Jury" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a Superior Court order that held a trial court was required to determine whether a child victim was competent to testify prior to admitting to her out-of-court statements into evidence under the Tender Years Hearsay Act (TYHA). Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, holding that a determination of a child's competency under the rules of evidence is not a prerequisite to the admission of hearsay statements under TYHA. View "Pennsylvania v. Walter" on Justia Law

Appellant Imanuel Bassil Ali appealed the dismissal of his second petition for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act as untimely filed. Appellant argued he suffered from mental incompetency at relevant times during his first PCRA proceedings so as to qualify his second PCRA petition for the newly-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time-bar. Because he failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Pennsylvania v. Ali" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial court properly gave an "error in judgment" jury instruction. The underlying case arose out of the death of a two-month-old child while under the care of his pediatricians. Appellees sued the pediatricians. Their experts testified that the doctors deviated from the standard of care by failing to refer the child for further testing. The trial judge held a charging conference and stated that all of the doctors' proposed points for charge would "either be read or covered." The judge, however, did not say which (if any) proposed changes would actually be read to the jury. Appellees did not object at the time. The judge then proceeded to discuss one of the doctors' proposed "error in judgment" charge. Counsel for Appellees objected that the instruction was inappropriate for this case. The judge ultimately included the "error in judgment" charge when instructing the jury. The jury later ruled in the doctors' favor. Appellees filed timely post-trial motions arguing, among other things, the trial court erred in giving the "error in judgment" charge. Approximately one month after Appellees filed their post-trial motions (and before the trial court ruled on those motions), the Superior Court filed its decision in "Pringle v. Rapaport," (980 A.2d 159 (Pa.Super. 2009)). In that case, the trial court had given a charge very similar to the one given here. Approximately one year later, the Superior Court decided Pringle, holding: "such an instruction should never be given because it 'wrongly suggests to the jury that a physician is not culpable for one type of negligence, namely the negligent exercise of his or her judgment.'" The trial court here denied Appellees' post-trial motions and entered judgment in the doctors' favor. The Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court applied Pringle correctly to the circumstances of this case. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Passarello v. Grumbine" on Justia Law

Appellee Christopher Williams was convicted of first degree murder and subsequently sentenced to death for the murders of three men in September of 1989. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on direct appeal. Appellee then sought post-conviction relief. The PCRA court initially granted Appellee relief on a basis unrelated to this appeal. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the PCRA court and remanded for disposition of Appellee's remaining claims. On remand, the PCRA court granted Appellee a new trial, finding that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate medical and forensic evidence and finding that appellate counsel likewise rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue on appeal that the trial court erred when it limited cross-examination of the Commonwealth's expert witnesses. Thirty days after the PCRA court entered its order granting Appellee a new trial, the Commonwealth electronically filed with the Philadelphia County Clerk of Courts a notice of appeal and jurisdictional statement appealing the grant of a new trial to the Supreme Court. The Clerk sent the Commonwealth an electronic confirmation indicating that the notice of appeal was received. Nonetheless, the Clerk refrained from time-stamping the notice of appeal on that date. Instead, the following day, the Clerk informed the Commonwealth that its notice of appeal was defective because it was missing two docket numbers and/or because the Clerk's office preferred a separate notice for each of the three docket numbers contained therein. The Commonwealth filed an amended notice of appeal that the Clerk accepted and time-stamped upon receipt. Appellee filed a Motion to Quash the Commonwealth's appeal with the Supreme Court, arguing that the appeal was untimely because the Commonwealth failed to file it within thirty days of the PCRA court's order, assuming the Commonwealth filed its notice of appeal on the date the Clerk time-stamped the amended appeal. Appellee argued the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because of the amended filing. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court found the Commonwealth's appeal as timely, and denied Appellee's Motion to Quash. View "Pennsylvania v. Williams" on Justia Law

This case arose from the liquidation proceedings of Reliance Insurance Company. One of Reliance's policyholders, Warrantech Consumer Products Services, Inc., submitted various proofs of claim seeking reimbursement under two insurance policies in which Reliance agreed to indemnify Warrantech for all future liabilities arising under certain warranty/service contracts Warrantech entered during the applicable policy period. The Commonwealth Court denied Warrantech's claims, holding that 40 P.S. 221.21 of the Insurance Department Act applied to terminate coverage for all "risks in effect" under a policy of insurance no later than thirty days after the respective insurer enters liquidation, notwithstanding that the relevant policies of insurance were cancelled prior to the date of liquidation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's judgment. View "Warrantech v. Reliance Ins Co." on Justia Law

In August, 2010, Appellants, Washington County residents Raymond and Donna Mantia, hired Appellee, West Virginia contractor Shafer Electric & Construction, to build a 34 foot by 24 foot, two-car garage addition onto their house. The proposals for the garage did not comply with several requirements of Section 517.7 of the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act. Specifically, any home improvement contract, in order to be valid and enforceable against the owner of real property, had to be legible, in writing, and contain thirteen other specific requirements. Despite the detail in the specifications for the work to be completed, the contract here only complied with subsections (5), (7), and (8) of Section 517.7(a). Notwithstanding these deficiencies, work on the project began in October, 2010, when Appellants, who owned their own excavation business, began the foundation excavation. When Appellee commenced construction of the addition, it contended that problems surfaced because of Appellants' failure to complete the excavation work properly. During the subsequent months, Appellants eventually reexcavated the foundation area for the addition and, in the process (according to Appellee), changed the design of the addition several times. Negotiations into these design changes and other necessary alterations as a result of the excavation problems occurred, but ultimately failed when Appellants apparently refused to enter into a new contract with Appellee. Upon the breakdown of the negotiations, the parties mutually agreed that Appellee would invoice Appellants for the work completed, and that Appellee would discontinue efforts on the project. Appellants refused to pay the bill. Appellee responded by filing a mechanic's lien in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas. When Appellants still had failed to satisfy the outstanding balance, Appellee filed a civil action in the common pleas court, alleging both breach of contract and quantum meruit causes of action. The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine whether the Act barred a contractor from recovery under a theory of quantum meruit in the absence of a valid and enforceable home improvement contract as defined by the Act. The Superior Court held that the Act did not bar a cause of action sounding in quantum meruit and, for slightly different reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shafer Electric & Construction v. Mantia" on Justia Law

In February, 2006, Konstantinos Koumboulis shot and killed his wife and himself inside his house. The murder/suicide was highly publicized in the local media and on the internet. The Jaconos purchased the property from the Koumboulis estate at auction in September, 2006, for $450,000. After investing thousands in renovations, the Jaconos listed the property for sale in June, 2007. They informed Re/Max, their listing agents, of the murder/suicide. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court for review was whether the occurrence of a murder/suicide inside a house constituted a material defect of the property, such that appellees' failure to disclose the same to the buyer of the house constituted fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law's (UTPCPL). The Court concluded a murder/suicide does not constitute an actionable material defect. View "Milliken v. Jacono" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia filed an Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit with the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections ("L&I") for conversion of the Nativity B.V.M. Elementary School into a 63-unit, one-bedroom apartment complex for low income senior citizens. The school was built in 1912 and operated by the Archdiocese in legal non-conformance with subsequently enacted zoning codes until 2008, when it had been closed due to declining enrollment and insufficient revenue. In 2009, the Archdiocese received funding under the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to convert the school to senior housing. L&I denied the Archdiocese's Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit as not in compliance with several provisions of the Philadelphia Zoning Code. The Archdiocese appealed to the City of Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment ("ZBA") for use and dimensional variances. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth Court applied an improper standard in reversing the ZBA's grant of a variance. After careful review of the Commonwealth Court's opinion the Court concluded that the court erred by relying on an improper standard for unnecessary hardship and by substituting its judgment for that of the ZBA, thereby applying an incorrect standard of review. View "Marshall v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia" on Justia Law