Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Harold Murray, IV, appealed the death sentence he received for his conviction on three counts of first degree murder. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but vacated the death sentence. The case was remanded for a new penalty hearing. View "Pennsylvania v. Murray IV" on Justia Law

Appellant raped and brutally murdered three women in separate incidents over a one-year span. Prior to the capital murder trial, appellant pled guilty to three counts of burglary, two counts of attempted criminal homicide, and two counts of firearms not to be carried without a license. The jury returned a guilty verdict of first-degree murder for each murder as well as guilty verdicts on all remaining charges. Appellant appealed a Court of Common Pleas order his first petition for relief. Finding that appellant did not meet his burden for relief, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court. View "Pennsylvania v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Issues of constitutional import stemming from cross-appeals taken from the Commonwealth Court's ruling on expedited challenges to Act 13 of 2012 were before the Supreme Court in this case. Act 13 contained sweeping legislation affecting Pennsylvania’s environment particularly the exploitation and recovery of natural gas in Marcellus Shale. The litigation was accelerated in part because the legislation itself was designed to take effect quickly and imposed obligations which required the challengers to formulate their legal positions swiftly; and in part in recognition of the economic importance of the legislation to the Commonwealth and its citizens. Following careful deliberation, the Supreme Court's decision found several challenged provisions of Act 13 were unconstitutional. Madame Justice Todd, and Mr. Justice McCaffery, found that several core provisions of Act 13 violated the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the Environmental Rights Amendment; other challenges lacked merit; and several issues required further Commonwealth Court proceedings. Mr. Justice Baer, concurred in the mandate, and joined the majority in all but Parts III and VI(C); Justice Baer would have found the "core constitutional infirmity" sounded in substantive due process. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson Township, et al v. Pa. Public Utility Commission and Attorney General -" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the Sunshine Act and whether meetings between an agency and outside entities, including those involved in ongoing litigation with that agency, were “deliberations” that should have been open to the public where the subject of the meetings was the same as that of the litigation. The agency claimed the meetings were held for information-gathering purposes only. The court of common pleas ruled in favor of the agency. After review of that court's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Smith v. Richmond Township" on Justia Law

PPM Atlantic Renewable (“PPM”) unsuccessfully requested that the Fayette County Zoning Board grant it numerous special exceptions and variances for it to build 24 windmill turbines on leased land. This matter involved whether an objector must comply with a county court order to post bond as a condition of appealing to the Commonwealth Court, where the developer was the appellant in the county court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court should not have quashed the objector's merits appeal based on the the objector's failure to post bond. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "PPM Atlantic Renewable v. Fayette County Zoning Hearing Board" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether Act 152 of 2004 (“Act 152”) violated the “single subject” rule of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,3 and, if so, whether the portions of Act 152 amending Pennsylvania’s “Megan’s Law” could be severed from the other provisions of the Act and remain in force. The Court concluded that Act 152 did violate Article III, Section 3, since its various provisions do not all relate to a single unifying subject. Furthermore, the Court struck Act 152 in its entirety. View "Pennsylvania v. Neiman" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the interpretation of Section 602 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law, which concerned the notice requirements for an upset tax sale for non-payment of delinquent taxes. Specifically, the issue centered on whether the Commonwealth Court correctly held that “proof of mailing” in subsection 602(e)(2) referred exclusively to United States Postal Service Form 3817 (a Certificate of Mailing). Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that although the Washington County Tax Claim Bureau did not obtain a Certificate of Mailing, it did proffer other documents from the USPS as evidence to establish “proof of mailing.” The Court held that these USPS documents satisfied the statutory mandate for “proof of mailing” in subsection 602(e)(2).View "Horton v. Washington County Tax Claim Bureau" on Justia Law

Appellees (husband and wife) created The Dorothy M. Miller Family Irrevocable Trust, naming Mrs. Miller as settlor, and her and her husband as co-trustees. The sole beneficiaries of the trust were appellees and their only child. Appellees transferred title to their house and farm to the trust, but did not pay realty transfer tax on the transfer, claiming it was an excluded transaction under the Realty Transfer Tax Act as a transfer to a "living trust." The Department of Revenue issued a Realty Transfer Tax Notice of Determination providing the transfer was subject to realty transfer taxes, plus applicable interest and fees. Appellees unsuccessfully petitioned for redetermination with the Department’s Board of Appeals. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that Mrs. Miller's testimony that she intended the Trust to be a substitute for her will was sufficient to define it as a living trust. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court found the Miller Trust failed to meet the statutory definition of a living trust or will substitute. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for calculation of transfer tax. View "Miller v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder for the shooting deaths of Mendez Thomas and Lisa Diaz. On appeal, appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support appellant's murder convictions. View "Pennsylvania v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Appellant Alexander Keaton appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claimed the PCRA court erroneously denied the underlying claim that his invoking a Fifth Amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogations on a rape charge invalidated his uncounseled, incriminating statements given weeks later in an unrelated murder and rape case. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found appellant never invoked his right to counsel in the initial rape case, and as such, the PCRA court did not err in denying appellant relief.View "Pennsylvania v. Keaton" on Justia Law