Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Michael Ballard directly appealed his death sentence to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. He pled guilty to four counts of first-degree murder. On appeal, Appellant raised four claims of trial court error regarding aspects of the penalty-phase hearing, the admissibility of victim-impact testimony, and the jury's weighing of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Appellant Kevin Mattison directly appealed his death sentence to the Supreme Court. He was convicted for first-degree murder for his involvement in the 2008 death of Christian Agosto. After careful consideration of the issues Appellant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded all of the issues raised lacked merit. Therefore, the Court affirmed Appellant's death sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Mattison" on Justia Law

In November 2002, Appellee Beverly Roethlein, an Allentown taxpayer, filed a class action complaint against Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd., and Michelle Portnoff, Esquire (the firm's sole shareholder) seeking recovery for unjust enrichment and violations of Section 502 of Act 6, Pennsylvania’s Loan Interest and Protection Law. Portnoff serves as a private tax collector for various municipalities and school districts, and had contracts with 22 municipalities to represent them in the collection of delinquent real estate taxes. Taxpayers would be charged $150 for the opening of a file and preparation of a demand letter; $150 for the filing of a lien and preparation of a second letter; and $150 for preparation and filing of a writ of scire facias. The contracts required the municipalities to enact an ordinance or resolution authorizing Portnoff to impose legal fees upon the delinquent taxpayer. From the time a file was sent to her for collection, Portnoff began charging 10% interest on the principal. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Loan Interest and Protection Law provided taxpayers with a cause of action to challenge costs imposed for the collection of delinquent taxes or to seek damages and attorneys’ fees for improperly-imposed costs. Furthermore, at issue was whether Section 7103 of the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act authorized a municipality to recover the administrative costs it incurs in collecting delinquent taxes. After review, the Court concluded that Act 6 does not provide a cause of action for claims which do not involve the loan or use of money. Furthermore, the Court concluded Section 7103 of the MCTLA allows a municipality to recover fees it pays to a third-party tax collector for the purpose of collecting delinquent taxes. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court, and remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "Roethlein v. Portnoff Law Assoc." on Justia Law

The Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare (DPW) and the Wyoming County Human Services appealed a Commonwealth Court order reversing DPW’s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals’ order refusing to expunge an indicated report of child sexual abuse relating to a father’s alleged abuse of his four-year-old daughter. The questions before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the admissibility of a videotape of the daughter’s allegations under the relevant hearsay exception for child victims and, if admissible, whether that videotape constituted the requisite substantial evidence for denying the father’s request to expunge. Upon careful review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the father in this case waived any challenge to the admissibility of the videotape by failing to object before the Administrative Law Judge both when he was unrepresented on the first day of the hearing and when he was represented by counsel on the second day of the hearing. Furthermore, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s determination that DPW failed to present substantial evidence to support the indicated report of sexual abuse under the Child Protective Services Law. View "R.A. v. DPW & Wyoming County Human Services" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from two armed robberies which occurred within two weeks of each other in October 2005 in Philadelphia. In both incidents, University students were approached by a man alleged to be Appellant, Benjamin Walker. The assailant drew a handgun, and demanded money. In this appeal by allowance the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a trial court may, in its discretion, permit expert testimony in the area of eyewitness identification, and, in doing so, the Court reconsidered its then-current decisional law which absolutely banned such expert testimony. The Court held that, in Pennsylvania, the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is no longer per se impermissible, and joined the majority of jurisdictions which leave the admissibility of such expert testimony to the discretion of the trial court. Thus, the order of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case remanded back to the trial court for reconsideration of such expert testimony. View "Pennsyvlania v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a Superior Court that affirmed the pre-trial order of the court of common pleas permitting appellee Jose Alicia to introduce expert testimony concerning the phenomenon of "false confessions" at his upcoming murder trial. Appellee filed a Motion for Use of a False Confessions Expert, averring that he was of low intelligence and has been an SSI disability beneficiary due to mental health issues most of his life. The only evidence identifying Appellee as the shooter of George Rowe (other than his confession) came from two corrupt sources, one of whom initially stated that the shooter was Jeremy Duffy. Appellee believed Duffy was the shooter, and that the evidence at trial would have shown that Appellee was told by Duffy’s associates to “take the fall for the real perpetrator.” According to the Motion, the text of Appellee’s confession, along with his handwritten corrections, "provide a number of clues indicating it is a false confession." Because the Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth that such testimony was not admissible, the Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Alicia" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the interpretation of the Commonwealth Charter School Law. Pursuant to the Charter School Law, the Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter School was awarded a charter for a five-year term ending June 30, 2005. In late 2004, the Charter School filed a renewal application. On March 16, 2005, the School Reform Commission of the School District of Philadelphia (“SRC”) adopted a resolution that granted, “upon signing a new Charter Agreement,” the Charter School’s request for renewal of the charter for a second five-year period commencing on September 1, 2005. The SRC denied the Charter School's request for expansion of enrollment, and granted approval "to enroll a maximum of six hundred and seventy five (675) students and serve grades kindergarten through 8." The SRC and the Charter School then entered into, as of September 1, 2005, a legally binding agreement that incorporated the SRC Resolution in its entirety and extended the charter for five years ("the 2005 Charter"). The 2005 Charter explicitly referenced and incorporated the SRC Resolution, one provision of which capped student enrollment, explicitly mandated that the Charter School comply with the SRC Resolution; and explicitly constituted a legally binding, mutual agreement of five years duration, the terms of which could not be changed absent a written agreement signed by both parties. The legally binding nature of the terms of the 2005 Charter was mandated by a provision of the Charter School Law. Notwithstanding the terms of the 2005 Charter, the Charter School consistently enrolled more than the 675 students permitted by that Charter. For the 2007-2008 school year, the Charter School’s average daily enrollment was approximately 729 students; for 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, the average daily enrollment was approximately 732 and 765 students, respectively. In each school year, the School District of Philadelphia provided funding for 675 students based on the 2005 Charter. In July 2010, asserting that it had been underpaid by the School District, the Charter School requested that the Pennsylvania Department of Education withhold $1,678,579 from the School District's basic education subsidy allocation as payment to the Charter School for the students it had educated in addition to the 675 students permitted by the enrollment cap for school years 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2009–2010. The School District objected to the withholding and a hearing was held before the Department. The Secretary of Education determined that the Charter School had agreed and legally assented to the enrollment cap when it signed the 2005 Charter, and therefore, the Charter School was not entitled to payment for students enrolled above that cap in the 2007-2008 school year. However, with regard to the school years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, the Secretary determined that the enrollment cap set forth in the 2005 Charter was no longer valid because of the enactment of an amendment to the Charter School Law which had become effective on July 1, 2008 (24 P.S. section 17-1723-A(d)). Based on his interpretation, the Secretary concluded that, to maintain the 2005 Charter’s enrollment cap subsequent to the effective date of the amendment, the School District was required to re-obtain the Charter School’s “legal assent” to the cap. Ultimately, the Secretary determined that the Charter School was entitled to payment by the School District for the education of all the students enrolled in the school for the years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, including those enrolled beyond the cap. The School District appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed. The School District appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed: "based on the plain text of 24 P.S. section 17-1723-A(d), we conclude that an enrollment cap is valid if agreed to by the parties as part of a written charter." View "Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia v. Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

Appellant Richard Baumhammers went on a two-hour crime spree in 2000 whereby he shot six racial or ethnic minorities. Four victims died of their wounds; the fifth was paralyzed from the neck down. During the spree, appellant burned his Jewish neighbor's house, and damaged two synagogues by spray painting swastikas on the outside then shooting bullets into both. Appellant was charged with five counts of first-degree murder and related offenses. He was found guilty by jury and sentenced to death. Appellant petitioned for post-conviction relief, which was ultimately denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court, appellant argued multiple instances of violations of appellant's constitutional rights were violated, and multiple instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (both at trial and in the penalty phase). The Supreme Court found no reason to overturn the PCRA Court's ruling on appellant's claims of error, and therefore affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Baumhammers" on Justia Law

Appellant fatally shot three men outside a private social club in Altoona after he and two friends were denied admission. Appellant was convicted and received the death penalty on three counts of first-degree murder. On direct appeal, appellant raised six issues for the Supreme Court's review, all challenging alleged errors in trial procedure and sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no errors, and holding that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant and support his sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Pennsylvania v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Ronald Weiss appealed the denial of guilt-phase claims raised in his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) court’s rejection of Appellant’s guilt-phase claims was supported by the record and free from legal error. However, because the PCRA court granted relief on a penalty phase issue and the Commonwealth did not cross-appeal, Appellant was afforded a new penalty hearing. Accordingly, the order of the PCRA court was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Weiss" on Justia Law